In In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, the parties signed a premarital agreement on the day before their impromptu wedding in Las Vegas. (Id. at p. 8.) Two weeks prior to the signing of the agreement, the husband's attorney had discussed its terms with the wife and told her that it would be in her best interest to consult an attorney. (Id. at p. 9.) On the day that they signed the agreement, the parties went to the husband's attorney's office where the attorney explained the agreement paragraph by paragraph to the wife. (Id. at p. 9.) The wife was accompanied by a friend with whom she consulted on several occasions before signing the agreement, and changes to the agreement were made at the wife's request. (Id. at p. 10.) The attorney again advised the wife to obtain counsel, but she expressly refused to do so. (Ibid.) The wife understood her community property rights and the terms of the agreement prior to signing. (Ibid.) Based on this record, the trial court found that the wife had voluntarily signed the agreement. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on the ground that the wife did not have independent counsel. The Supreme Court first reviewed the history of section 1615 in order to determine how the Legislature used the term "voluntarily." (Bonds, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 16-21.) The Bonds court then identified several factors that courts must consider in determining the voluntariness of a premarital agreement, including "the coercion that may arise from the proximity of execution of the agreement to the wedding, or from surprise in the presentation of the agreement; the presence or absence of independent counsel or of an opportunity to consult independent counsel; inequality of bargaining power-in some cases indicated by the relative age and sophistication of the parties; whether there was full disclosure of assets; and the parties' understanding of the rights being waived under the agreement or at least their awareness of the intent of the agreement." (Id. at pp. 18-20.) The court also stated that the factors "are not rigidly separate considerations; rather the presence of one factor may influence the weight to be given evidence considered primarily under another factor. In this respect, the trial court's finding that the wife had advance knowledge of the meaning and intent of the agreement and what was at stake for her is influential, as we have seen, in considering some of the other factors." (Id. at p. 37.) Applying these factors, the Supreme Court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that the wife had voluntarily signed the premarital agreement.