In re Marriage of Iverson

In In re Marriage of Iverson (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 1495 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70, the trial judge upheld a premarital agreement against the wife's attack, finding her story incredible. The judge said in part: "The petitioner . . ., Cheryl Iverson, only had five or six luncheon dates with Chick Iverson before she decided to move into his home. Now, he sure as heck does not look like John Wayne and he doesn't look like John Derek. And even if we take 17 years off him, I don't think he looks like Adonis. And, so, . . . we have a girl who . . . was lovely, . . . but . . . . had nothing going for her except for her physical attractiveness. Who, somehow or other, comes to the attention of Mr. Iverson and, after five or six luncheon dates, is invited to move into his home. . . In light of the testimony that Mr. Iverson had come out of a very . . . unhappy marriage, his statement that he was reluctant to get married again adds some dimension here. . . . And, so, he decides that living together rather than marriage is the best thing for him. He makes an offer to petitioner, who thinks it's good. And then she moves in. I cannot accept the fact that, as she said, he was the one that proposed marriage to her. That would be the last thing that would be on his mind. And why, in heaven's name, do you buy the cow when you get the milk free, as we used to say. And, so, he's getting the milk free. And Cheryl is living with him in his home. And the impetus for marriage must be coming from her side, because there's nothing Mr. Iverson is going to get out of it. . . . He's got everything that he would want out of a relationship with none of the obligations. . . ." ( Iverson, supra, 11 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1498-1499.) The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for retrial before a different judge because the trial judge's reasoning was "so replete with gender bias that we are forced to conclude Cheryl could not have received a fair trial." ( Iverson, supra, 11 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1497.) The court found overwhelming evidence that the judge "entertained preconceptions about the parties because of their gender" ( id. at p. 1499): (1) The judge's characterization of Cheryl as a "lovely girl," with no corresponding label for her husband, suggested that "the resolution of the credibility issues in the case . . . may have been based, at root, on Cheryl's gender and physical attributes." (Ibid.) (2) The word "lovely" in this context also gave off "more than a faint whiff of ' "romantic paternalism" ' . . ." ( Id. at p. 1500.) (3) Calling a woman in her 40's a "girl" "seriously detracts from the appearance of justice." (Ibid., original italics.) (4) Aside from terminology, the judge's reasoning was based on gender stereotypes: " 'Lovely' women are the ones who ask wealthy men who do not look like 'Adonis' to marry, and therefore Cheryl was not credible when she testified Chick asked her to marry him." (Ibid.) (5) The judge's "reference to not buying the 'cow' when the 'milk is free' " contained "an obvious double standard based on stereotypical sex roles. (Both Chick and Cheryl were living together, but only Chick was seen as benefitting from the relationship, simply because he was a man.) And we hardly need elaborate that in the context in which it was used, the reference was plainly demeaning to Cheryl, analogizing her to a cow. Again we find a 'predetermined disposition' to rule against her based on her status as a woman." ( Id. at pp. 1500-1501.)