In In re Tate (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 756, the reviewing court applied the reasoning of Reeves to a situation of consecutive sentencing that statutorily could not be considered a single aggregate term. Specifically, in Tate the petitioner was convicted of, and sentenced to state prison for, a violent offense triggering the application of the 15 percent credit limitation of section 2933.1(a). (Tate, supra, at p. 758.) The petitioner was subsequently convicted of possessing a weapon in prison and sentenced to two years to be served consecutively. (Id. at p. 759.) Section 1170.1, subdivision (c) provides, in relevant part, that a consecutive sentence for an in-prison offense "shall commence from the time the person would otherwise have been released from prison." The reviewing court in Tate held the restriction of section 2933.1(a) did not apply to the petitioner's consecutive term for a nonviolent in-prison offense. (Tate, supra, at pp. 761-766.) Specifically, the court noted the consecutive sentence for the in-prison nonviolent offense was not merged or aggregated with the petitioner's original term by operation of section 1170.1, subdivision (c). Thus, once the petitioner completed his sentence for the violent offense, he was no longer subject to imprisonment for such offense--he was "no longer a 'person who is convicted of a violent felony offense' ( 2933.1(a))." (Tate, supra, at p. 765.) Accordingly, the petitioner was eligible for worktime credit on his consecutive sentence. (Id. at pp. 765-766.) In Tate, the prisoner would have been released for his violent offense but for the commission of the nonviolent in-prison offense, for which he was statutorily required to serve a consecutive sentence beginning after the completion of his other term. (Id. at p. 765.)