In In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, an unmarried mother was living with her boyfriend when she became pregnant during a two-week affair with a former high school boyfriend. ( Id. at p. 439.) After giving birth, mother and son remained with the current boyfriend. Like Melissa, the mother did not tell the old boyfriend about the pregnancy. ( Id. at p. 452.) He eventually learned about the child and sought reunification services, which the trial court denied because he was not a presumed father. Our Supreme Court affirmed and observed the former boyfriend was not a presumed father because he had not taken the boy into his home. It rejected his argument that his ignorance of his son's birth until the child was about 15 months old excused him from not having received the boy into his home. The court found he did not know about his son because he did not ask. (Ibid.) His lack of diligence defeated any claim that the mother had thwarted his effort to become a presumed father. As the court explained: "While under normal circumstances a father may wait months or years before inquiring into the existence of any children that may have resulted from his sexual encounters with a woman, a child in the dependency system requires a more time-critical response. Once a child is placed in that system, the father's failure to ascertain the child's existence and develop a parental relationship with that child must necessarily occur at the risk of ultimately losing any 'opportunity to develop that biological connection into a full and enduring relationship.'" ( Id. at p. 452.) In the case of In re Zacharia D. (1993) the Supreme Court held that, aside from the mother, only the "presumed father" is a "parent" entitled to custody of his child. (At p. 439.) "In order to become a presumed father, a man must fall within one of several categories enumerated in Civil Code section 7004, subdivision (a) now Fam. Code, 7611. The only relevant category in this case is Fam. Code, 7611, subd. (d), which provides that a natural father may become a presumed father if 'he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.'" ( Zacharia D., supra, at p. 449.) Thus, parental rights are not conferred on a man merely based on biology; the father must also demonstrate his connection to the mother and/or the child. (Id. at pp. 448-449, citing In re Sarah C. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 964, 974.) Zacharia D. states that "The 'superior court has the authority to grant a biological father custody of his child so that he can qualify as a presumed father . . . .'" (Id. at p. 449.) In Zacharia D., the father showed no effort to support his child or to develop any relationship with him. In addition, the father had a lengthy, current and debilitating drug problem. The father also announced he was interested in marrying the child's mother, apparently oblivious to the fact that reunification services had recently been terminated for her due to her detrimental care of Zacharia. Accordingly, the juvenile court found that return of Zacharia to the father would create a substantial risk of detriment to the minor, which is a specific statutory basis to deny placement with a parent who requests custody. ( 361.2, subd. (a).) The father did not act within 18 months and did not act appropriately to become a presumed father. It is for these reasons that the father's parental rights were terminated in Zacharia D.