Injury Statute of Limitations Clock Stop

Section 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which introduces the title dealing with the time of commencing civil actions, provides: "Civil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued . . . ." on certain causes of action the law in California has evolved to a point where the limitations clock begins to run only "when the injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts supporting liability." ( Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 502, 512 [121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 535 P.2d 1161, 79 A.L.R.3d 807], and cases cited.) The Davies court held that California "generally now subscribe[s] to the view that the period cannot run before plaintiff possesses a true cause of action, by which we mean that events have developed to a point where plaintiff is entitled to a legal remedy, not merely a symbolic judgment such as an award of nominal damages." ( Id. at p. 513.) In Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal. 3d 195 [98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433], the court held that the limitations period on the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim did not begin until plaintiff had suffered "appreciable harm." ( Id. at p. 200.) "The mere breach of . . . duty," said the court, "causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm--not yet realized" normally "does not suffice to create a cause of action." (Ibid.)