In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, a computer company brought an action against a former employee seeking an injunction to prevent him from sending e-mails to plaintiff's employees. The employee had used Intel's internal e-mail system, which was connected to the Internet, to send e-mails to between 8,000 and 35,000 employees on six specific occasions, and he refused to stop when Intel requested that he do so. (Id. at pp. 1348-1349, 1381.) The trial court granted summary judgment for Intel and issued a permanent injunction on a theory of trespass to chattels. (Id. at p. 1350.) The appellate court affirmed and our state's highest court reversed on the grounds that the tort of trespass to chattels does not encompass, and should not be extended to encompass, the employee's electronic communications, which neither damaged nor impaired the functioning of Intel's computer system. (Id. at p. 1353.) The Court found that in the absence of any actual damage, a cause of action for trespass to chattels will not lie; a mere momentary or theoretical deprivation of use is not sufficient unless there is a dispossession. Accordingly, Intel's complaint was about the content of the employee's messages rather than the functioning of the company's e-mail system. (Id. at pp. 1356-1359.) In dicta, the court noted that the use of government power, i.e., an injunction, is state action subject to the First Amendment. Nonetheless, the court recognized that those who physically trespass on private property may be restrained even when attempting to exercise free speech rights. (Id. at pp. 1364-1365.)