In Johnson v. Superior Court (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 829, the defendant was served with a subpoena to produce documents pursuant to section 1985, which required a witness to appear and " 'bring with him any books, documents, or other things under his control which he is bound by law to produce in evidence.' " (Johnson, supra, at p. 835.) The defendant appeared for his deposition but refused to produce the documents described in the subpoena. (Id. at p. 833.) The plaintiff moved for an order pursuant to former section 2034 compelling the defendant to answer questions he had refused to answer at his deposition and forcing him to produce the records described in the subpoena. The plaintiff also sought ?reasonable costs and attorney's fees, incurred because of this proceeding ... ." (Johnson, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 833, fn. 2.) The court granted the motion and ordered the defendant to produce the items at a " 'further taking of his deposition.' " The court also ordered the defendant to pay the costs of "taking said deposition past and future." (Id. at p. 833.) Former section 2034, subdivision (a) in effect in 1968 governed the consequences of a deponent's refusal to answer questions during a deposition. Former section 2034, subdivision (a) authorized a party to move for an order compelling a witness to answer questions at his or her deposition or for an order requiring the witness to produce documents at the deposition. (Former 2034, subd. (a); Stats. 1961, ch. 496, 3, p. 1592.) That statute provided: "If the motion is granted and if the court finds that the refusal was without substantial justification the court may require the refusing party or deponent and the party or attorney advising the refusal or either of them to pay to the examining party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order including reasonable attorney's fees." (Ibid.) The appellate court vacated the order for several reasons. (Johnson, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 837.) At the end of its opinion, the appellate court "pointed out" that former section 2034, subdivision (a) limited sanctions to "the 'reasonable expenses incurred by the successful party in obtaining the order' compelling discovery." (Johnson, supra, at p. 840.) The Johnson court concluded that former section 2034, subdivision (a) did not authorize the trial court to award the costs of a future deposition. As the court explained, the trial court "not only ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff's costs in taking the deposition which was the subject of its motion for relief under section 2034, subdivision (a), but also ordered him to pay plaintiff's costs in taking his deposition in the future. In doing so, the court far exceeded its powers as prescribed in that section." (Johnson, supra, at p. 840.) The appellate court stated: "The clear import of all the cases dealing with the subject is that a subpoena duces tecum has no force or effect if the affidavit required by former section 1985 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not comply with the provisions of that section. The requirement of that section that the affidavit must contain a showing of good cause for the production of the matters and things described in the subpoena and 'shall set forth in full detail the materiality thereof to the issues involved in the case' is not met by an affidavit which is totally devoid of any statement of facts." The court further stated, "to secure discovery by use of a subpoena duces tecum, there must be a showing of more than a wish for the benefit of all the information in the adversary's files ..." (id. at p. 837), and "'a mere allegation that the records are material ... constitutes a conclusion of law which does not meet the requirements' of Code of Civil Procedure section 1985" (id. at p. 836). The appellate court added, "the trial court must be afforded the factual data by the required affidavit to enable it to make an informed ruling on the issues of materiality and good cause." (Id. at p. 837.) In Johnson v. Superior Court, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at page 837, the declaration supporting the subpoena duces tecum stated in part that the affiant believed that the documents sought by the subpoena "'are material to the proper presentation of his case by reason of the following facts: They are necessary to prove the allegations in the Complaint. Wherefore affiant prays that Subpoena Duces Tecum issue.'" Concluding the declaration was insufficient, the appellate court explained: "This declaration fails to show any facts with reference to the alleged materiality of the desired documents either to the issues or to the subject matter of the litigation, and is devoid of any allegations whatever directed to the requirement of good cause. Similarly, we note that the entire declaration, such as it is, is based wholly on the declarant's alleged information and belief without any statement of supporting facts. Since the declaration is patently insufficient for the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum, which petitioner was charged with disobeying , it was an abuse of the court's discretion to order petitioner to obey the subpoena." (Ibid.) The appellate court issued a writ commanding the trial court to vacate its order, accordingly. (Id. at p. 840)