In Joslin v. H.A.S. Insurance Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, the Court addressed whether a court may properly take judicial notice of a plaintiff's deposition testimony and rely on its truth in sustaining a demurrer. (Joslin, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 374.) There, the defendant insurer successfully demurred on statute of limitations grounds on the theory the plaintiff -- who had alleged the insurer wrongfully refused her claim for repairs under a vehicle service contract -- knew its identity when the original complaint was filed. (Id. at pp. 372-373.) It relied in part on portions of the plaintiff's deposition, in which she admitted contacting an employee of the defendant after her car broke down in an attempt to obtain payment. (Ibid.) Addressing whether the trial court could properly judicially notice that testimony on demurrer, the appellate court rejected the notion -- assertedly suggested in Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17 4 -- that a court can never accept the truth of statements in a deposition. (Joslin, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 375, fn. 1.) Instead, it applied an approach permitting the trial court to accept the truth of the facts within the plaintiff's deposition "only to the extent they were not or could not be disputed." (Id. at p. 375.) Doing so, it concluded the testimony was not properly subject to judicial notice. It reasoned that even though the plaintiff admitted having received a brochure identifying defendant when she purchased the car and also speaking with the defendant's employee on the phone, she disputed (in opposing points and authorities) her knowledge of the man's status as an employee: "After carefully examining the deposition testimony in question, we conclude that it does not undisputably establish plaintiff's knowledge, when the complaint was filed, of their having dealt with an employee of H.A.S. The explanation given by plaintiffs in their papers opposing the demurrer -- in which they said they learned only at the deposition of the employment status of the 'man in San Jose' -- is not inherently incredible and is not necessarily inconsistent with the deposition testimony. Otherwise stated, if the version set forth in plaintiffs' opposition papers were presented by appropriate testimony and the deposition testimony were offered in impeachment, the question of when plaintiffs acquired the knowledge in question could not be determined as a matter of law. As the knowledge was not established beyond dispute by the deposition evidence, the court could not consider it established for purposes of ruling on the demurrer." (Id. at pp. 375-376)