Welfare and Institutions Code section 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases. The court may impose "any . . . reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Id., subd. (b).) In an adult probation setting, "a condition of probation which: (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted; (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal; (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality does not serve the statutory ends of probation and is invalid." ( People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 627 64 Cal. Rptr. 290; accord, People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 481, 486 124 Cal. Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.) In re White (1979) 97 Cal. App. 3d 141 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 defendant found guilty of soliciting an act of prostitution was granted probation on condition she not go into certain high-prostitution areas of the City of Fresno; court held factual nexus between the proscribed activity and future criminality was tenuous and the condition interfered with her right to intrastate travel; People v. Beach (1983) 147 Cal. App. 3d 612 195 Cal. Rptr. 381 an elderly widow convicted of involuntary manslaughter was placed on probation on condition that she relocate from the community where she had resided in her own home for 24 years; appellate court struck the condition as unreasonably broad, not sufficiently related to future criminality, and violative of constitutional rights; People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal. App. 3d 937 260 Cal. Rptr. 62 26-year-old defendant convicted of false imprisonment and assault granted probation on condition his residence be approved by the probation officer, effectively banishing him from living with or near his parents; condition invalid because nothing in the record suggested his home life contributed to the crime of which he was convicted or was reasonably related to future criminality.) However, as explained in In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal. App. 3d 1232 285 Cal. Rptr. 16, juvenile conditions may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders. This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed. the state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents. and a parent may "curtail a child's exercise of the constitutional rights . . . because a parent's own constitutionally protected 'liberty' includes the right to 'bring up children' citation, and to 'direct the upbringing and education of children." ( Id. at p. 1243; In re Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 921, 928 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286.) In In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1368 257 Cal. Rptr. 821, although the issue addressed was whether a probation officer may unilaterally impose a new condition restricting travel to a particular locale (he or she may not), a panel of this division noted: "Conditions infringing on constitutional rights are not automatically invalid citation; indeed, they will pass muster if tailored to fit the individual probationer. For example, while a travel restriction may be proper for a minor who lives outside the gang's territory, it may be overbroad for one who lives, works or goes to school within the area. But the court alone is empowered to determine the propriety of the proposed conditions and their applicability to the individual offender." ( Id. at p. 1373, italics added; cf. In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal. App. 4th 1077 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 no reasonable basis for sustaining a condition requiring a minor to absent himself from the country of his residence.)