In Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 95, the Supreme Court revisited the showing necessary to establish that a communication is "confidential" under section 632. There, the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that the Georgia-based defendant could not be held liable under section 632 for recording telephone conversations with California residents because the conduct was permissible under Georgia law. The Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 632 applied to conversations in which only one party was in California. Although Kearney was primarily a choice-of-law case, the Supreme Court's governmental interest analysis required it to assess the scope of section 632 and the interests protected by the statute. The court concluded that California had a "strong and continuing interest in the full and vigorous application of ... section 632," but noted that the statute prohibits monitoring or recording only "without the knowledge or consent of all parties to the conversation" (Kearney, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 125) and only " 'if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded' " (id. at p. 117, fn. 7.) The Supreme Court nevertheless rejected the Court of Appeal's suggestion that, under California law, "even in the absence of an explicit advisement, clients or customers of financial brokers ... 'know or have reason to know' that their telephone calls with the brokers are being recorded." (Kearney, at p. 118, fn. 10.) The court noted that no authority had been cited "establishing such a proposition as a matter of law, and in light of the circumstance that California consumers are accustomed to being informed at the outset of a telephone call whenever a business entity intends to record the call, it appears equally plausible that, in the absence of such an advisement, a California consumer reasonably would anticipate that such a telephone call is not being recorded ... ." (Ibid.) Underscoring the factual inquiry necessary to determine the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' privacy expectations, the court observed that "because this case is before us after the sustaining of a demurrer, we cannot assume for purposes of this appeal that the telephone conversations here at issue were not 'confidential communications' within the meaning of section 632." (Ibid.)