In Keitel v. Heubel (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 324, on the day before judgment was entered against him on a jury verdict for $ 361,267, the defendant executed several grant deeds transferring his real property into a revocable living trust. (Id. at p. 329.) Because the defendant maintained he was no longer the owner of property transferred to the trust, the sheriff was unable to levy upon the property to satisfy the judgment. (Id. at pp. 329-330.) The judgment debtor then sought, and successfully obtained, a writ of execution against the property in the trust. In an order very similar to the one challenged in this appeal, the trial court in Keitel found that the trust was revocable within the meaning of Probate Code section 18200, such that the trust property was subject to claims of the judgment debtors, and based on this finding the court ordered a writ of execution to issue. (Id. at p. 330.) On appeal, the court unanimously approved this procedure, noting that Probate Code section 18200 "clearly and explicitly permitted Keitel, as a judgment creditor, to reach real property held in the trust over which the Heubels retained the power of revocation." (Id. at p. 337.) The appellate court went on to reject numerous challenges raised by the debtor, concluding the order was "supported by sound legal authority." (Id. at p. 339.) Indeed, contrasting this weight of authority against the flimsy arguments raised by the debtor, the court concluded his appeal of the order issuing a writ of execution was sanctionable because it was frivolous and "quite obviously taken solely for purposes of delay. Footnote and citation." (Ibid.)