In Kelly v. County of Los Angeles (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 910, the plaintiff asserted that the employer's action of sending the plaintiff a letter informing her that it was unable to accommodate her temporary work restrictions and was removing her from the regular payroll constituted "the functional equivalent of a termination" of employment and thus a dismissal under section 31725. (Kelly, supra, at pp. 923-924.) The appellate court stated: "Although the plaintiff correctly observes that the March 18, 1996 letter, fairly interpreted, advised the plaintiff that the employer had no available position to accommodate her 'temporary work restrictions,' the letter on its face did not indicate that the employer viewed those restrictions as permanent. Nor is a dismissal established merely by the fact that the plaintiff was taken off the regular payroll. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the term 'dismissed' does not simply mean the absence of a salary. A person could be on unpaid leave, perhaps as a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act for a significant period of time, but that alone is not sufficient to find a termination." (Id. at p. 924.) The appellate court in Kelly, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at page 924, further stated, "nevertheless, assuming the employer viewed the plaintiff's work restrictions as permanent, if the employer had informed the plaintiff of its inability to accommodate her permanent work restrictions and left it at that, without any indication of alternative employment, the plaintiff would have a strong basis for asserting she had been functionally terminated on grounds of permanent disability. But that is not what happened." The appellate court's conclusion that the plaintiff had not been dismissed was based on the employer's offer of vocational rehabilitation for a different position--an act that was inconsistent with "a severance of the employment relationship." (Id. at pp. 924-925.) Also, the plaintiff had testified that she did not believe she had been terminated after receiving the letter stating that there were no available positions to accommodate her temporary work restrictions. (Id. at p. 925.) The appellate court further observed that, following completion of vocational rehabilitation, the plaintiff did not contact the employer's return-to-work coordinator or any other administrator for a new placement and did not seek clarification from her employer regarding the status of her employment relationship with the employer. (Id. at pp. 925-926 "As Stephens makes clear, however, it is the employee's obligation to seek clarification in the event he or she is uncertain as to the continuing existence of the employment relationship.".) The Kelly court explained its conclusion no dismissal occurred was "reinforced by the legislative purpose of section 31725. Section 31725's retroactive-reinstatement requirement is intended to act as a safety net for those employees who find themselves 'in limbo, having neither employment nor disability income.' The plaintiff did not face this financial dilemma in March 1996 when she was given vocational rehabilitation and statutory compensation in the form of Labor Code section 139.5 benefits. She thus did not fall in the class of persons left without employment or disability income that section 31725 was intended to protect. To the extent the plaintiff lacked employment-related income following the cessation of her vocational rehabilitation benefits in July 1997, that was the product of her own inaction, rather than the result of a termination. Nothing prevented the plaintiff from returning to the employer following her completion of her vocational rehabilitation and requesting placement. As we have explained, had the plaintiff requested placement following vocational rehabilitation and been denied employment with the employer, it would have been reasonable to conclude she had been functionally dismissed at that point. In sum, the March 18, 1996 letter does not evince an intent to sever the employment relationship nor is such an intent reflected in any of the evidence in this case, all of which is generally undisputed." (Kelly, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 926.)