In Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 296, the plaintiff was injured in touch football game when the defendant stepped on her hand and severely injured her little finger. Because of continuing pain and the plaintiff's failure to ever fully recover movement, the finger was amputated. In resisting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted her own declaration and the declaration of another participant in which they stated that only moments before injuring plaintiff defendant had been asked "not to play so rough," that he ran into the plaintiff from behind, knocked her down, stepped on her hand and continued running until he had tagged and knocked down the ball carrier. In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that these declarations were sufficient to establish recklessness, the court in Knight stated "the conduct alleged in those declarations is not even closely comparable to the kind of conduct--conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport--that is a prerequisite to the imposition of legal liability upon a participant in such a sport." (Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 320-321.) In the course of its discussion of the doctrine of assumption of risk, the court in Knight v. Jewett was careful to point out that in any sporting activity there are risks which participants do not assume. "Although defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport. Thus, although a ski resort has no duty to remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does have duty to use due care to maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition so as not to expose skiers to an increased risk of harm. The cases establish that the latter type of risk, posed by a ski resort's negligence, clearly is not a risk (inherent in the sport) that is assumed by a participant." (Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal. 4th at pp. 315-316.) In Knight v. Jewett (1992) the Supreme Court addressed the proper application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine in light of its holding in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828-829 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393, where it adopted the comparative fault system in place of contributory negligence. The court drew a distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk. ( Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal. 4th at p. 308.) "In cases involving 'primary assumption of risk'--where, by virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury--the doctrine continues to operate as a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery. In cases involving 'secondary assumption of risk'--where the defendant does owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff encounters a known risk imposed by the defendant's breach of duty--the doctrine is merged into the comparative fault scheme, and the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties." ( Id. at pp. 308, 314-315.) The question of whether the defendant owed a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk of harm turns on the nature of the activity or sport in which the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport. ( Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal. 4th at pp. 308, 313-315.) "The question of the existence and scope of a defendant's duty of care is a legal question . . . and is an issue to be decided by the court, rather than the jury." ( Id. at p. 313.) The California Supreme Court examined the interplay between California's comparative fault scheme and the assumption of the risk doctrine in the sports setting. The court summarized: "In cases involving 'primary assumption of risk'--where, by virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury--the doctrine continues to operate as a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery. In cases involving 'secondary assumption of risk'--where the defendant does owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff proceeds to encounter a known risk imposed by the defendant's breach of duty--the doctrine is merged into the comparative fault scheme, and the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties." Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pages 314-315. The court concluded that, in determining which doctrine applied, the pivotal question is whether, in light of the nature of the sport involved, defendant breached a legal duty of care to the plaintiff, or rather, had a legal duty to protect the plaintiff against a particular risk of harm in the first instance. Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pages 315, 316-317. In addressing this question, the California Supreme Court noted that, although the defendant generally has no legal duty to eliminate inherent risks, the defendant generally owed sports participants a duty to use due care in not increasing the risks beyond those inherent in the sport. Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 316. Sports participants, however, usually cannot recover for injury caused by another participant's negligence, which often is treated as an inherent risk of the sport. Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 316. Significant, therefore, is the defendant's role--i.e., coparticipant in the sport, owner of the sports facility, manufacturer of sports equipment, instructor of the sport, or organizer of a sporting event--in determining the scope of his or her legal duty. Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pages 317, 318.