In Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, the Supreme Court considered the breadth of the Unruh Act. The plaintiffs, a same-gender couple who had been in a relationship since 1993, challenged a country club policy that extended golfing privileges to the spouses of married club members but denied those privileges to unmarried couples. Shortly after the enactment of the 2005 Domestic Partner Act, the plaintiffs registered as domestic partners with the State. Because the Domestic Partner Act was passed during the pendency of the plaintiffs' suit, the Supreme Court construed the complaint as seeking Unruh Act damages for two distinct time periods: the period during which they were registered as domestic partners and the period prior to the effective date of the domestic partnership law. (Id. at pp. 836-837.) The Court first analyzed the period during which the plaintiffs were registered domestic partners and considered "whether, in light of the current version of the domestic partnership law, the Act requires businesses to treat registered domestic partners the same as spouses." (Koebke, supra, at p. 837.) To answer this question, the Court applied the Harris framework. It began by evaluating whether status as a registered domestic partner constituted a personal characteristic, which the Court defined as "traits, conditions, decisions, or choices fundamental to a person's identity, beliefs and self-definitions." (Id. at pp. 842-843.) The Court found that the decision to enter into a formalized domestic partnership did qualify as a "personal characteristic" because it reflected "personal beliefs and core values." (Id. at p. 843.) In support, the Court noted that the Legislature, through the enactment of the Domestic Partner Act, granted domestic partners all of the same rights, benefits, responsibilities and obligations that are granted to spouses. (Ibid.) It further noted that the statute specifically described domestic partnerships as "'lasting, committed, and caring'" relationships "undertaken by two individuals to 'share their lives together . . .' " (Id. at p. 843.) The Court next analyzed whether the country club had demonstrated a legitimate business interest in extending benefits to spouses but not registered domestic couples. The Club argued that broadening its policy to include nonmarried couples "might lead to overuse of facilities, create a disincentive for such friends to apply for membership, and would discourage its 'legitimate goal of creating a family-friendly environment by welcoming the immediate family of married members.'" (Koebke, supra, at p. 847.) The Court rejected these arguments, noting that the club's concerns "did not apply to registered domestic partners" because, under the Domestic Partnership Act, "registered domestic partners occupy a legal status that, like marital status, is formalized, public and verifiable." (Ibid.) The Court ruled that the consequences of barring discrimination against domestic partners would be limited in that it would only affect "registered domestic partners, not all unmarried couples." (Koebke, supra, at p. 848.) Moreover, prohibiting such discrimination would "effectuate the Legislature's intent expressed in the Domestic Partner Act to create substantial legal equality between registered domestic partners and spouses." (Ibid.) Having concluded the Unruh Act barred discrimination on the basis of domestic partner status, the Court next considered whether the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable Unruh Act claim for the time period preceding the effective date of the Domestic Partner Act. The Court framed the relevant issue as "whether, during this earlier period, the Club's denial of spousal benefit to plaintiffs constituted impermissible marital status discrimination under the Act." (Koebke, supra, at p. 851.) The Court declined, however, to decide whether marital status was categorically "precluded . . . as a protected category under the Unruh Civil Rights Act." (Ibid.) Instead, it concluded that under Harris, "even if we assume that marital status discrimination, outside the context of the Domestic Partner Act, is cognizable under the Act, such discrimination would nonetheless be permissible if justified by 'legitimate business interests.'" (Ibid.) The club argued that its spousal benefit policy was legitimately intended to "strike a balance between competing concerns. The club wanted to attract and maintain members while preventing overutilization of its facilities." (Koebke, supra, at p. 851.) The Court accepted this justification, explaining that the club "could reasonably have concluded that these goals would best be served by extending certain benefits to families created through marriage but not to unmarried couples and individuals." (Ibid.) The Court then denied the plaintiffs' claims, reasoning that "prior to The Domestic Partner Act, a marriage license presented the clearest method by which the club could distinguish among its members in order to extend benefits to some, but not to others, and achieve its larger goals. In this connection, the club was . . . free to cut finer distinctions than married and unmarried, but its failure to do so, even though it may have resulted in some degree of unfairness to committed couples like plaintiffs, did not on its face constitute impermissible marital status discrimination." (Id. at p. 852.)