"The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) "Once the movant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the other party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action ... ." (Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subd. (p)(1); see Aguilar, at p. 850.) A triable issue of material fact exists where "the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Where summary judgment has been granted, "we review the trial court's decision de novo, considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports." (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) The California Supreme Court in State of California v. Continental Ins. Co. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 186, 194-195 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 281 P.3d 1000 has recently reiterated the principles that apply when interpreting an insurance policy: "'"While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply." (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538, 833 P.2d 545; see AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 821-822 274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253.)' (Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 868 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107, 959 P.2d 265.) 'The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.' (Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1264; Civ. Code, 1636.) 'Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract.' (AIU, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 822; see Civ. Code, 1639.) 'If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.' (Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1264.) '"The 'clear and explicit' meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their 'ordinary and popular sense,' unless 'used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage' (Civ. Code, 1644), controls judicial interpretation. (Id., 1638.)" .' (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1.)" The Supreme Court has also explained that a term "is not ambiguous merely because the policies do not define it." (State of California v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 195; see Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 866 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 691, 855 P.2d 1263; Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1264-1265; Castro v. Fireman's Fund American Life Ins. Co. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1120 253 Cal. Rptr. 833.) Rather a provision will be considered ambiguous when it is "'capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.'" (State of California v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 195; see Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 18, citing Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 867.) Moreover, "'"language in a contract must be construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in the circumstances of that case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract."'" (State of California v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 195; see Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1265, quoting Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 916.) Thus, a term is not ambiguous because of "'disagreement concerning the meaning of a phrase,'" or "'"the fact that a word or phrase isolated from its context is susceptible of more than one meaning."'" (State of California v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 195; see Castro v. Fireman's Fund American Life Ins. Co., supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1120.) "'If an asserted ambiguity is not eliminated by the language and context of the policy, courts then invoke the principle that ambiguities are generally construed against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist (i.e., the insurer) in order to protect the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage.'" (State of California v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 195; see La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 27, 37.) The California Supreme Court has further stated that policy exclusions are strictly construed (MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2003) 31 Cal.4th 635, 648 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 73 P.3d 1205), but exceptions to exclusions are broadly construed in favor of the insured (Aydin Corp. v. First State Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1183, 1193). "While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply. " (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264-1265, 833 P.2d 545.) "The fundamental rules of contract interpretation are based on the premise that the interpretation of a contract must give effect to the 'mutual intention' of the parties. . . . 'Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract. The "clear and explicit" meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their "ordinary and popular sense," unless "used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage" , controls judicial interpretation. ' " ( Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18, 900 P.2d 619.) "If the policy is ambiguous (i.e., susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation), the ambiguity is construed in favor of coverage. However, the predicate to interpreting ambiguities in favor of coverage is that the policy be reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Where a policy clearly excludes coverage, we will not indulge in tortured construction to divine some theoretical ambiguity in order to find coverage." ( Titan Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 457, 469.) " 'Although exclusions are construed narrowly and must be proven by the insurer, the burden is on the insured to bring the claim within the basic scope of coverage, and (unlike exclusions) courts will not indulge in a forced construction of the policy's insuring clause to bring a claim within the policy's coverage.' Accordingly, the insured has the burden of showing that there has been an 'occurrence' within the terms of the policy. " ( Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 16.)