The "unambiguous purpose" of the three strikes law "is to provide greater punishment for recidivists." (People v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1096, 1099.) Under the law, defendants who have been previously convicted of either a violent or serious felony may get longer prison sentences than defendants who have no such prior convictions. (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) In considering whether a defendant falls outside the spirit of the three strikes law, the question is whether the defendant "should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161; Pen. Code, 1385, subd. (a).) In resolving this question, the court "must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of the defendant's present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part." (People v. Williams, supra, at p. 161.) If a prior felony strike conviction is dismissed, "the sentencing court is concluding that an exception to the three strikes scheme should be made because . . . this defendant should be treated as though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme." (People v. McGlothin (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 468, 474.) "Because the circumstances must be 'extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack' , the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary." (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) The "unambiguous purpose" of California's Three Strikes law "is to provide greater punishment for recidivists." (People v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1096, 1099.) Under the law, defendants who have been previously convicted of either a violent or serious felony, may get longer prison sentences than defendants who have no such prior convictions. (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) In considering whether a defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law, the question is whether the defendant "should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams); Pen. Code, 1385, subd. (a).) In considering whether a defendant should be so treated, "the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of the defendant's present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part." (Williams at p. 161.) If a prior felony strike conviction is dismissed, "the sentencing court is concluding that an exception to the Three Strikes scheme should be made because . . . this defendant should be treated as though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme." (People v. McGlothin (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 468, 474.) "Because the circumstances must be 'extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack' , the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary." (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) As Penal Code section 1170.12, subdivision (b)(1) states, the three strikes law defines a "strike," in part, as follows: "Any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state. The determination of whether a prior conviction is a prior felony conviction for purposes of this section shall be made upon the date of that prior conviction and is not affected by the sentence imposed unless the sentence automatically, upon the initial sentencing, converts the felony to a misdemeanor. None of the following dispositions shall affect the determination that a prior conviction is a prior felony for purposes of this section: "(A) The suspension of imposition of judgment or sentence. "(B) The stay of execution of sentence. "(C) The commitment ... as a mentally disordered sex offender following a conviction of a felony. "(D) The commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center ... ." Thus, the three strikes law itself defines those prior convictions that are considered strikes. Whether a conviction is a strike "is not affected by the sentence imposed unless the sentence automatically, upon the initial sentencing, converts the felony to a misdemeanor." ( 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) Both robbery ( 211) and carjacking ( 215, subd. (a)) are enumerated strikes. ( 667.5, subd. (c)(9), (17), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19), (27).) Thus, absent any limitation external to the three strikes law, both of defendant's priors would be treated as strikes, because neither was converted to a misdemeanor automatically upon sentencing. ( 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) In People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983 (Sanchez), overruled on another point in People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1228-1229 (Reed), the California Supreme Court addressed a claim that it would be unfair to treat current second degree murder and gross vehicular manslaughter convictions arising out of the same act as two strikes in a future prosecution. As the court stated in Sanchez: "We are not faced with that question in the present case, but we believe it is appropriate and prudent to note that in this court's decision in Benson, we observed that a trial court may strike a prior felony conviction under section 1385, and that we left open the possibility that 'there are some circumstances in which two prior felony convictions are so closely connected ... that a trial court would abuse its discretion under section 1385 if it failed to strike one of the priors.'" (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 993; see also People v. Ortega (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 659, 668-669.) The Three Strikes law provides longer sentences for persons convicted of a felony who previously have been convicted of a violent felony, as defined in section 667.5, subdivision (c), or a serious felony, as defined in section 1192.7, subdivision (c). A defendant convicted of a felony who has one or more strikes must be sentenced for the current offense under the Three Strikes law. ( 667, subd. (f)(1), 1170.12, subd. (d)(1).) Also, when a person is currently convicted of a serious felony, an additional five-year prison term must be imposed for any prior conviction brought and tried separately that qualifies as a serious felony. ( 667, subd. (a)(1).) A conviction in another jurisdiction qualifies as a strike if it contains all of the elements required for a serious or violent felony in this state. ( 667, subd. (d)(2); People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 453.) Similarly, a conviction qualifies for the five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), if it includes all the elements of a serious felony. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of a prior conviction used to enhance a defendant's sentence. (People v. Williams (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 911, 915.) In determining the truth of the existence of a prior felony conviction in another jurisdiction for invoking punishment under the Three Strikes and other enhancement laws, "the trier of fact may look to the entire record of the conviction to determine the substance of the prior foreign conviction; but when the record does not disclose any of the facts of the offense actually committed, the court will presume that the prior conviction was for the least offense punishable under the foreign law." (People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 354-355 (Guerrero).) When a defendant challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court's finding the prosecution has proven all the elements of the enhancement, we must determine whether substantial evidence supports that finding. Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; People v. Fielder (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1232. The Supreme Court held in People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 that the trial court is empowered under section 1385, subdivision (a) on its own motion to dismiss or strike prior felony conviction allegations in cases that are brought under the law known as the "Three Strikes" law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) The court's discretion, however, is limited to instances in which dismissing such strikes is in the furtherance of justice, as determined by giving "'"consideration both of the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People . . . ."'" (Id. at p. 530.) Thus, the court may not strike a sentencing allegation "solely 'to accommodate judicial convenience or because of court congestion' citation, or simply because a defendant pleads guilty. Nor would a court act properly if 'guided solely by a personal antipathy for the effect that the three strikes law would have on a defendant,' while ignoring 'defendant's background,' 'the nature of his present offenses,' and other 'individualized considerations.' " (Id. at p. 531.) The Supreme Court later explained further "the 'concept' of 'furtherance of justice' within the meaning of Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a) which Romero had recognized as being '"amorphous."' " (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 159 (Williams).) The high court noted that in deciding whether to dismiss a strike "'in furtherance of justice' pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (Id. at p. 161.) The sentence to be meted out to the defendant "is also a relevant consideration . . . in fact, it is the overarching consideration because the underlying purpose of striking prior conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences. " (People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500.) Furthermore, the court may give "no weight whatsoever . . . to factors extrinsic to the Three Strikes scheme." (Williams, supra, at p. 161.) If the court strikes or dismisses one or more prior conviction allegations, its reasons for doing so must be stated in an order entered on the minutes. (Ibid.; cf In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 546, fn. 6 trial court has no obligation to set forth reasons for decision not to strike or dismiss prior strikes.) As the court explained in Williams, the granting of a Romero motion is "subject to review for abuse of discretion. This standard is deferential. But it is not empty. Although variously phrased in various decisions , it asks in substance whether the ruling in question 'falls outside the bounds of reason' under the applicable law and the relevant facts. " (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 162; see also People v. Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 503.) And this abuse of discretion standard also applies to appellate review of the denial of Romero motions. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374-376; see also id. at p. 374: "'Discretion is the power to make the decision, one way or the other.'") It is the defendant's burden as the party attacking the sentencing decision to show that it was arbitrary or irrational, and, absent such showing, there is a presumption that the court "'"acted to achieve the legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review."' " (Id. at p. 377.)