In Liodas v. Sahadi (1977) 19 Cal.3d 278 , the plaintiff, as trustee of a bankruptcy estate, brought an action against the defendant for damages for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint alleged that defendant, the bankrupt's former attorney, deprived the bankrupt of certain assets by fraudulently persuading him to enter a buyout agreement transferring the assets to the attorney for inadequate consideration. The jury returned a substantial verdict for the trustee, awarding compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant moved for a new trial; the trial court granted the motion and vacated the judgment, but limited the new trial to the issue of damages. The trustee appealed from that order, and the defendant cross-appealed from the order insofar as it restricted the new trial to the issue of damages. (Id. at pp. 282-283.) The Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly ordered a new trial on damages. It explained that while the jury had been instructed on two theories of liability--ordinary fraud and fraud by a fiduciary--it had been given a damages instruction only for fiduciary fraud. The trial court's failure to instruct on ordinary fraud damages was prejudicial error because the jury had no alternative but to apply the broader fiduciary fraud standard even if it found that the fiduciary relationship had terminated. (Liodas v. Sahadi, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 283-284.) Thus, the trial court properly granted a new trial on compensatory damages. (Id. at p. 284.) The court then considered whether the trial court erred in limiting the new trial to damages. It noted that a request for a partial new trial "'should be considered with the utmost caution citations and that any doubts should be resolved in favor of granting of complete new trial.' In short, 'When a limited retrial might be prejudicial to either party, the failure to grant a new trial on all of the issues is an abuse of discretion.'" (Liodas v. Sahadi, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 285-286.) The court declared itself "hesitant" to find such an abuse of discretion because both the jury and the trial court had determined liability in the trustee's favor. However, such a result was necessary under the facts of the case: "In view of the erroneous damages instructions it is not possible to determine on what basis liability was predicated. The trier of fact in any new trial would be required, prior to awarding damages, to decide whether respondent was acting in a fiduciary or nonfiduciary capacity. Moreover, the complaint was based not only on the buy-out agreement, but also on numerous transactions prior to the buy-out which were alleged to be fraudulent. Evidence as to the bankrupt's losses from these other incidents was presented. However, defendant explained some of these events, and evidence on others was in conflict; a second trier of fact would have no basis for determining which of the transactions the first jury actually found fraudulent, and which, if any, it found fair. These issues go to the heart of the liability question. As they must be redetermined prefatory to any damages verdict, the matter of liability is substantially inseparable from that of damages in the present posture of the case. A partial new trial would be prejudicial to defendant. A new trial on all issues is thus required." (Id. at p. 286.) The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's grant of a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages and reasoned: "Exemplary damages must be redetermined as well, as 'it would be improper and premature to assess such damages until or concurrently with the assessment of the "actual damages" and 'exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relation to actual damages' even though no fixed ratio exists to determine the proper proportion." In Liodas, the court held a complete new trial was required as it was not possible to determine on what basis the jury had found liability. (Liodas v. Sahadi, supra, 19 Cal.3d 278, 285-286.) It was not clear whether the jury based liability on a theory of ordinary fraud or fraud by a fiduciary--when each theory of liability invoked a different measure of damages. (Liodas, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 283-284.) The issue was whether a new trial limited to damages was proper when it could not be determined "on what basis liability was predicated. The trier of fact in any new trial would be required, prior to awarding damages, to decide whether defendant was acting in a fiduciary or nonfiduciary capacity." (Id. at p. 286.) Under that circumstance, a new trial limited to damages was an abuse of discretion because "the matter of liability is substantially inseparable from that of damages in the present posture of the case." (Ibid.)