In Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, the court held beneficiaries whose bequests arguably failed because the testator's lawyer did not adequately safeguard the will from challenge under the rule against perpetuities could assert a claim for professional negligence against the lawyer. In Lucas, supra, 56 Cal.2d 583, the Supreme Court applied the Biakanja v. Irving (1958) factors to determine whether an attorney may be liable to the intended beneficiaries of a deceased testator for losses resulting from negligence in drafting a will. (Id. at p. 588 "same general principle articulated in Biakanja must be applied in determining whether a beneficiary is entitled to bring an action for negligence in the drafting of a will when the instrument is drafted by an attorney rather than by a person not authorized to practice law".) The residuary trust in the will prepared by the defendant contained language that arguably violated the rule against perpetuities and statutory restrictions relating to restraints on alienation. As a result, after the testator died, the plaintiffs entered into a settlement with certain of the testator's relatives under which they received a share of the estate significantly less than they would have received pursuant to testamentary instruments property drafted in accordance with the directions of the testator. (Id. at pp. 586-587.) Because the defendant in Lucas was an attorney, however, in addition to the Biakanja factors the court held it was necessary to consider "whether the recognition of liability to beneficiaries of wills negligently drawn by attorneys would impose an undue burden on the profession." (Lucas, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 589.) The court concluded the extension of a drafting attorney's liability to "beneficiaries injured by a negligently drawn will" did not threaten an undue burden on the legal profession and held the other factors identified in Biakanja supported recognition of a cause of action for professional negligence in these circumstances. (56 Cal.2d at p. 589.) "As in Biakanja, one of the main purposes which the transaction between defendant and the testator intended to accomplish was to provide for the transfer of property to plaintiffs; the damage to plaintiffs in the event of invalidity of the bequest was clearly foreseeable; it became certain, upon the death of the testator without change of the will, that plaintiffs would have received the intended benefits but for the asserted negligence of defendant; and if persons such as plaintiffs are not permitted to recover for the loss resulting from negligence of the draftsman, no one would be able to do so and the policy of preventing future harm would be impaired." (Ibid.) Although holding the lack of privity between the intended beneficiaries and the drafting attorney did not preclude an action in tort against the attorney, the Supreme Court also famously held: "in view of the state of the law relating to perpetuities and restraints on alienation," a drafting error that arguably invalidated the trust provisions in the will did not constitute negligence: "An attorney of ordinary skill acting under the same circumstances might well have 'fallen into the net which the Rule spreads for the unwary' and failed to recognize the danger." (Lucas, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 592-593.)