In Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 154, after the landlords had served notice under the Ellis Act (Gov. Code, 7060 et seq.) that they intended to withdraw certain rental units from the market, the tenants of some of those units brought a declaratory relief action to clarify their rights under that statute. The landlords filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending that the tenants' complaint arose from the landlords' action in filing and serving the Ellis Act notices, and from other litigation involving the removal of the rental property from the market. The trial court granted the SLAPP motion, thereby striking the tenants' cause of action and dismissed their declaratory relief action. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court that the SLAPP motion was appropriate and reversed its order. After quoting the key language from section 425.16 (a), the court wrote: "Even if we assume filing and serving the Ellis Act notice and the notice to vacate constituted protected petitioning or free speech activity 'the mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.' Rather, the critical question in a SLAPP motion 'is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity.' Defendants have fallen victim to the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc--because the notices preceded plaintiffs' complaint the notices must have caused plaintiffs' complaint. The filing and service of the notices may have triggered plaintiffs' complaint and the notices may be evidence in support of plaintiffs' complaint, but they were not the cause of plaintiffs' complaint. Clearly, the cause of plaintiffs' complaint was defendants' allegedly wrongful reliance on the Ellis Act as their authority for terminating plaintiffs' tenancy. Terminating a tenancy or removing a property from the rental market are not activities taken in furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech." (Marlin, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 160-161). In short, two tenants brought an action against their landlord for a declaration of the parties' rights under the Ellis Act, Government Code sections 7060 et seq. The trial court dismissed the action after granting the landlord's section 425.16 motion to strike. (Marlin, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 156-157.) The appellate court reversed, holding that "the cause of plaintiffs' complaint was defendants' allegedly wrongful reliance on the Ellis Act as their authority for terminating plaintiffs' tenancy. Terminating a tenancy or removing a property from the rental market are not activities taken in furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech." (Id. at pp. 160-161.)