McFadden v. Jordan

In McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330, the California Supreme Court was confronted by an initiative proposing to add 21,000 words to our then existing 55,000-word Constitution, affecting 15 of its 25 articles. The measure dealt with such disparate subjects as retirement pensions, gambling, taxes, healing arts, civic centers, surface mining, fishing, city budgets, liquor control, senate reapportionment, and oleomargarine. ( Id. at pp. 334-345.) The California Supreme Court concluded that the measure constituted an improper revision of the State Constitution, characterizing it as "far reaching and multifarious," denying the electorate an opportunity to express approval or disapproval severally as to each major change suggested. ( Id. at pp. 332, 346.) The Supreme Court commented: "The delegation of far reaching and mixed powers to the commission, largely, if not almost entirely in effect, unchecked, places such commission substantially beyond the system of checks and balances which heretofore has characterized our governmental plan. It will be remembered that the measure prescribes no qualifications for holding the office of commissioner, other than that the person 'shall have been an elector of this state for two years next preceding his election'; he is, as of absolute right, eligible for re-election; the commission, itself, may fill vacancies for unexpired terms; it has unlimited powers to propose and submit 'amendments' to the 'article'; every sentence and clause of our Constitution in conflict with the article is to 'the extent of such conflict' repealed; the commission is given practically uncontrolled power over the funds collected, including, apparently, the substantially absolute power to give 'reimbursement or compensation for expenses incurred by' a 'volunteer worker in a political campaign'; the commission is given power to issue subpoenas and, apparently, to punish for contempt and subject persons 'to the same penalties as if such disobedience or false swearing occurred in an action in the superior court.' The governor, the Legislature, and the courts are made powerless to remove a commissioner for any cause, or directly 'to interfere with the effectiveness or operation of this article,' apparently as construed by the commissioners; or, without approval by a vote at a general election 'subsequent to 130 days after such decision or order shall become final,' to enforce 'any decision or order' of a court 'in any action or proceeding in law or equity' 'which adversely, or at all, either affects this article or the administration thereof or affects the submission, by the pension commission, of any proposed amendment to this article.' Thus, in litigation anywhere within the vast sweep of the measure (from gamblers to ministers; from mines to civic centers; from fish to oleomargarine; from state courts to city budgets; from liquor control to senate reapportionment; from naturopaths to allopaths; from proposing constitutional amendments to reimbursing political campaign workers; and from taxes to pensions), our heretofore zealously guarded principle of justice equally available through the courts for poor and for rich, for weak and for strong, and for all of every station alike, would be fettered, if not discarded, and justice, in its final attainment, would depend not alone on the justice of the cause, not as of right on the verdict of a jury or on truth or law or equity, but on the political sagacity and acumen, and the financial ability, of the litigant to wage a successful political campaign in defense of the judgment to which the court had found him entitled." ( Id. at pp. 348-349.)