In Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249 , the California Supreme Court addressed the question whether a stipulated agreement for custody might constitute a final judicial custody determination for purposes of application of the "changed circumstance rule." That rule requires a party seeking to modify a permanent custody order to demonstrate a significant change of circumstances justifying a modification and provides that absent such change, the court need not reexamine that question. (Id. at pp. 256-257.) The court concluded that stipulated custody orders might be final judicial custody determinations for purposes of the rule, but also recognized that many stipulated custody orders were not intended to be final judgments. (Id. at p. 258.) The Court found that two orders entered during the course of a family court proceeding were "temporary" and thus not final custody determinations requiring application of the changed circumstance rule. The court explained, "Although these orders included detailed visitation schedules and did not provide for further hearings, . . . neither order contained a clear, affirmative indication that the parties intended it to be a final judicial custody determination. In addition to the ambiguities in the orders themselves, the parties' conduct following the entry of these orders strongly suggest that they did not intend for these orders to be final judgments as to custody." (Montenegro v. Diaz, supra, at p. 259.) The mother in Montenegro, argued that the changed circumstance rule applied because the child had lived with her since birth, not because the prior court order was a final custody determination. (Montenegro v. Diaz, supra, 26 Cal.4th 249.) In Montenegro, the Supreme Court determined a custody order resulting from a stipulation by the parties could be treated as a final judicial determination for purposes of applying the changed circumstance rule to a subsequent modification request so long as the parties clearly stated their intent that the original stipulation be treated as a final order. (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 257-258.) Montenegro did not concern a determination under section 3030, subdivision (a), with its statutory presumption of harm, and thus offers no guidance here. Contrary to the trial court's assumption, Montenegro did not concern whether the trial court clearly stated its intent that its orders be final. The issue in that case was whether the parties stated their intent in their stipulation. In fact, the high court in Montenegro assumed a judicial determination of a child's best interest derived from an adversarial factfinding process was a final order for purposes of the changed circumstance rule. (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 256-257.) The Court recognized the practical reality that stipulated custody orders often are not intended to conclusively resolve the dispute. The court held: "Many stipulated custody orders are not intended to be final judgments. Child custody proceedings usually involve fluid factual circumstances, which often result in disputes that must be resolved before any final resolution can be reached. Although the parties typically resolve these disputes through stipulations confirmed by court order, they often do not intend for these stipulations to be permanent custody orders. Indeed, these temporary custody orders serve an important role in child custody proceedings, and our statutory scheme expressly provides for them. (See, e.g., Fam. Code, 3061.) Because many parties would not enter into a stipulated custody order if a court might later treat that order as a final judicial custody determination, we must be careful in construing such orders. Otherwise, we may discourage these parties from entering into such stipulations." ( Montenegro v. Diaz, supra, 26 Cal. 4th at p. 258.) ) Therefore the California Supreme Court held, in a move-away case, "We hold that a stipulated custody order is a final judicial custody determination for purposes of the changed circumstance rule only if there is a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended such a result." (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court explained that "once it has been established that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interests of the child, the trial court need not reexamine that question. Instead, under the changed circumstance rule, it should preserve the established mode of custody unless some significant change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in the child's best interest." (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256.) "'The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test.'" (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 255.) "We must uphold the trial court 'ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked.'" (Montenegro, at p. 255.) In the absence of a final judicial custody determination, "the court and the family have 'the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interests of the child.'" (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 255.)