In People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, the defendant had stolen liquor from a store and fled. While fleeing, the defendant ran into the backyard of a nearby residence, where he assaulted two citizens. The Supreme Court noted that in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585 at pages 591-595: "We rejected an argument that the analysis for determining whether Penal Code section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) and (7) (see also 667, subd. (c)(6) and (7)) requires consecutive sentencing is coextensive with the test for determining whether section 654 permits multiple punishment. We explained that section 654 is irrelevant to the question of whether multiple current convictions are sentenced concurrently or consecutively under the three strikes law, because section 654 does not allow any multiple punishment, whether concurrent or consecutive, and the analysis performed under the two statutes are entirely separate. " (People v. Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 226.) The Lawrence court went on to hold that because there was no ambiguity in the term "committed on the same occasion," its "usual and ordinary meaning" must control. (People v. Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 229; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Utilizing the "close spatial and temporal proximity" test of Deloza, our Supreme Court held in Lawrence that the defendant's theft from the market and subsequent aggravated assaults were not committed on the same occasion. (People v. Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 229.) In Lawrence, our Supreme Court explained: "We do not believe it was intended that the mandatory consecutive-sentencing provision of the three strikes law not apply to the commission of different crimes perpetrated against different groups of victims merely because the later crimes occurred while the defendant was still in flight from the initial crime scene. No principle of criminal law shields a defendant from conviction of all such offenses, nor does section 654 prohibit multiple punishment for crimes of violence against multiple victims." (Ibid.; People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 78.) Finally, in Lawrence our Supreme Court held the offenses did not arise from the same set of operative facts: "The first crime involved an act of theft directed at one group of victims, the second involved assaultive conduct directed at an unrelated pair of victims. The two criminal episodes were separated spacially sic by at least one to three city blocks, and temporally by two to three or more minutes . . . ." (People v. Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 234.)