In Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, a county government was sued for medical malpractice when a young mother was hospitalized for heart surgery at a county facility and ended up with brain damage. There was a dispute over whether the brain damage was the result of the mother not getting enough oxygen (if so, it would be the county's fault) or whether the damage was done during the heart surgery itself (in which case it was a risk that could not have been prevented). (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1400.) The county contracted the defense of the case out to an experienced lawyer at a well-known medical malpractice defense firm. Several months before trial though, the experienced lawyer retired. The county then asked one of his partners, also highly experienced, to try the case. This new lawyer devoted more than 250 hours to reviewing medical records and deposition transcripts. (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1392.) There was one continuance, from January to March, to complete discovery, and after that continuance there was another continuance, from March to July, because the new defense lawyer had a conflict with another trial. (Id. at p. 1392.) But the defense lawyer would need a third one. The date that was set for trial was July 9. Six days before that, however, the defense lawyer learned that another, older, case in Compton in which he was defense counsel -- ostensibly set for trial on July 8, but which he had assumed, based on his opposing counsel's representations, would be continued -- was going to go July 8 after all. When July 9 came, the defense lawyer asked for a continuance (the older case had commenced and was expected to last two weeks). (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.) The defense lawyer belonged to a fairly large medical malpractice defense firm, but all but one of that firm's "senior trial attorneys" were themselves already in trial, and the remaining one was on vacation in Europe. None of the firm's other lawyers had experience in cases of the complexity of the Oliveros case. And no one was prepared to try the case. (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.) None of the defense attorney's predicament persuaded the trial judge in Oliveros, though. In fact, the judge was irritated that the particular defense counsel in question "'takes too many cases.'" (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.) But in any event the trial judge thought an experienced trial attorney needed only a few days preparation. (Ibid.) The trial judge did, however, give a de facto continuance of about six days to allow the firm to seek a writ with the Court of Appeal. The six days passed. The defense lawyer returned to the Compton trial. The Oliveros trial went undefended. And after four days of jury trial, the trial court directed a verdict resulting in a $ 12.5 million judgment against the county. (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394.) The appellate court reversed the multi-million dollar verdict, in a ringing affirmation of the principle that, when the two policies collide, justice beats efficiency. In fact, the court said so twice: "'When the two policies collide head-on, the strong public policy favoring disposition on the merits outweighs the competing policy favoring judicial efficiency. (Cf. Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1532, 1533 when evaluating dismissal of action for delay in prosecution, policy favoring expeditious administration of justice by compelling prompt and diligent prosecution of actions subordinate to policy favoring trial on merits.)'" (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1395, quoting Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 398-399.) And again: "'Accordingly, decisions about whether to grant a continuance or extend discovery "must be made in an atmosphere of substantial justice. When the two policies collide head-on, the strong public policy favoring disposition on the merits outweighs the competing policy favoring judicial efficiency.'"" (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396, quoting Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246-1247.) The Oliveros court was thus not impressed with trial judge's decision. It lacked "balance." (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) Worse, it was unrealistic. The trial court had assumed that "any person with a license to practice law, or at least one associated with a 'big' law firm, could come to court without any preparation and try a complicated medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff was particularly sympathetic yet liability was far from certain." (Id. at p. 1397.) That assumption "belied an understanding of the subtleties of such litigation." (Ibid.) The Oliveros court went on to show sympathy for the dilemma faced by the defense attorney whose scheduling conflict required him to be in two places at once: "We note as well that, while the trial court chastised Mr. Peterson for losing control of his calendar and attempting to control the court's calendar, it is a fact of life that a trial lawyer's time is not his own. For while trial courts are under great pressure to manage large caseloads, so too are lawyers under equally great pressure 'to juggle trials in two or more courts, each presided over by a judge who sometimes has to trail cases or otherwise upset the lawyers' efforts to manage their own calendars.' . . . Thus, the trial court was well off the mark in announcing that the scheduling conflict before him was 'not my problem.' To the contrary, because this scheduling conflict affected the administration of justice, it was indeed the judge's problem, and one that he was obligated to make every effort to address in a manner which ensured the just resolution of the case before him. In the absence of evidence of a lack of good faith, the trial court as well as counsel on both sides should acknowledge the scheduling difficulties that from time to time disrupt the flow of litigation, and consider reasonable solutions that satisfy the interests of all parties." (Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.) The Oliveros court finished up (see Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1398-1400) with three thoughts. The first was to emphasize the importance of granting continuance requests so that "'physically able'" counsel can be present. (Id. at p. 1398.) The second referenced Chief Justice Ronald M. George's Blue Ribbon Panel on fair and efficient administration of civil cases, which resulted in a court rule directing attention to the problem of counsel being engaged in another trial. (Id. at p. 1399.) Three, it noted that the failure to grant a continuance can be "tantamount to a terminating sanction." (Id. at p. 1399.)