In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 168, the court addressed the distinction between the terms " 'merit principle' " and " 'merit system.' " ( Brown, supra, 29 Cal. 3d at p. 184, fn. 7.) The former was the concept of recruiting, selecting, and promoting public employees under conditions of political neutrality, equal opportunity, and competition based on merit. "Merit system" referred to the larger system of personnel management. (Ibid.) In Brown, the petitioners argued that since the Constitution used the term " 'general system based on merit,' " that the "merit system" as well as the "merit principle" was embodied in the constitutional provision. (Ibid.) The court disagreed. Although the terms had distinct meanings among knowledgeable experts in the field, there was no evidence the draftsmen of the 1934 provision understood this distinction. The court found the Constitution required only the merit principle, not a particular system. "We think that the 1934 ballot argument makes it quite plain that the draftsmen of the provision intended only 'to prohibit appointment and promotion in State service except on the basis of merit,' and did not intend to engrave into the state Constitution every aspect of the then current civil service system." (Ibid.) Subject to the merit principle, "the constitutional provision left the Legislature with a 'free hand' to fashion 'laws relating to personnel administration for the best interests of the State.' " ( Id. at p. 184.) In Brown, the court upheld the constitutionality of the State Employer-Employee Relations Act (SEERA), although it permitted certain civil service statutes to be superseded by a memorandum of understanding between the Governor and the exclusive employee representatives. ( Brown, supra, 29 Cal. 3d at pp. 181-196.) In Brown, the court addressed a constitutional challenge to SEERA, which permitted certain civil service statutes to be superseded by a memorandum of understanding between the Governor and the exclusive employee representatives. The challengers contended SEERA conflicted with the merit principle embodied in the California Constitution. In upholding SEERA, the court noted, "in designating the statutes that may be superseded by a memorandum of understanding without legislative approval, the Legislature excluded those statutes relating to classification, examination, appointment, or promotion, areas in which a potential conflict with the merit principle of employment would be most likely to occur." ( Id. at p. 185.) The petitioners contended State Employer-Employee Relations Act (SEERA) was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the general merit system of employment embodied in the civil service provisions of article VII of the Constitution. ( 29 Cal.3d at pp. 174, 181.) The Supreme Court reviewed the history of the constitutional amendment which became article VII. It determined "the 'sole aim' of the amendment was to establish, as a constitutional mandate, the principle that appointments and promotions in state service be made solely on the basis of merit. Having established this 'merit principle' as a matter of constitutional law, and having established a nonpartisan Personnel Board to administer this merit principle, the constitutional provision left the Legislature with a 'free hand' to fashion 'laws relating to personnel administration for the best interests of the State.'" ( Id. at pp. 183-184.) In Brown, the court reviewed a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute that established a system of collective bargaining that did not conflict with article VII nor involve a disciplinary action. ( 29 Cal.3d at p. 200 "no actual jurisdictional conflict between PERB and the State Personnel Board confronts us in this proceeding".) The petitioners argued that SEERA facially violated the Constitution in two ways. First, the collective bargaining process conflicted with the general merit principle of civil service employment. ( Brown, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 181.) Second, the task of setting salaries (which SEERA made a subject of collective bargaining) flowed from the SPB's constitutional authority to "prescribe ... classifications" and "enforce civil service statutes ... ." ( Id. at p. 186.) Brown considered whether the provisions of SEERA granting PERB jurisdiction to investigate and devise remedies for unfair practices might be invalidated by the SPB's authority to "review disciplinary actions." It said that, with respect to meeting and conferring in good faith over wages and working conditions and reprisals against an employee for protected activity, "PERB could clearly adjudicate unfair practice charges against the state without any danger of conflict with the personnel board's disciplinary action jurisdiction." ( 29 Cal.3d at p. 197.) The court also considered the possibility that "the jurisdiction of the State Personnel Board and PERB might overlap," and suggested the provisions could be harmonized in cases where the "specialized watchdog functions" of PERB might "involve the consideration of ... disciplinary action." ( 29 Cal.3d at pp. 197-199.) The California Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme does not violate the merit principle, and that the Legislature carefully crafted the statutes with the constitutional mandate of article VII firmly in mind. ( Id. at p. 174.) Brown recognized that "theoretically the product of the collective bargaining process may possibly in specific instances conflict with the merit principle," such as if the Governor and an exclusive bargaining representative agreed to an MOU authorizing hiring or promotions on a politically partisan basis. ( Id. at p. 185, orig. italics.) However, the scheme "neither explicitly nor implicitly authorizes any such an encroachment on the merit principle of article VII through the collective bargaining process." (Ibid.) Rather, the Legislature reaffirmed the primacy of the merit principle and carefully crafted the statutes to minimize any potential conflict. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court noted: "The act ... provides that, except with respect to a number of specific statutes which the Legislature has expressly determined may be superseded by a memorandum of understanding, any provision of a memorandum of understanding in conflict with a statutory mandate shall not be effective unless approved by the Legislature. 3517.6" ( Brown, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 178.) "In designating the statutes that may be superseded by a memorandum of understanding without legislative approval, the Legislature excluded those statutes relating to classification, examination, appointment, or promotion, areas in which a potential conflict with the merit principle of employment would be most likely to occur." ( Id. at p. 185.)