"'Parents are entitled to due process notice of juvenile proceedings affecting their interest in custody of their children. and due process requires "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'" (In re Anna M. (1997) 54 Cal. App. 4th 463, 468, quoting In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal. App. 3d 1413, 1418, 286 Cal. Rptr. 239.) Consequently, ". . . a parent is entitled to be apprised of the charges he or she must meet in order to prepare his or her case, and . . . must be given an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine his or her accusers." (In re Neal D. (1972) 23 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1048, 100 Cal. Rptr. 706 disapproved on other grounds in In re B. G. (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444.) In Marshall M. v. Superior Court (1999) the court specifically rejects the analysis of Shawn S. v. Superior Court (1998) and interprets subdivision (b)(10) differently. It concludes that part (A) refers to parents who have previously received, and failed, reunification with other children, and thus who should be considered to have already "failed to take reasonable steps to treat the problems" which led to the removal of those children, as a matter of law. Part (B), according to Marshall M., refers only to those parents who had parental rights severed in a prior case, but without receiving any reunification. The court suggests that the "classic situation" under part (B) would be "A parent's complete abandonment of a child based on the unknown whereabouts of that parent . . . ." (Marshall M. v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 56-57.)