In People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal.3d 615, the California Supreme Court considered what rules should apply when an accused claims there has been an unreasonable delay in arresting and charging him. The Archerd court held that the speedy trial right had no application to such a claim. "One does not become an accused until the filing of a complaint. The provisions of the Sixth Amendment contemplate a pending charge, not the mere possibility of a criminal charge." (Id. at p. 639.) Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court found that due process could be violated by a "preindictment delay" if the delay "were purposeful, oppressive, and even 'smack of deliberate obstruction on the part of the government' . . . ." (Id. at p. 640.) In Archerd, there was an 11-year delay between the first of a series of murders committed by the defendant and the time an indictment was filed against him. The delay was caused by the absence of a scientific test to confirm the suspicion of the police that the defendant had murdered his victims by the injection of insulin. The California Supreme Court rejected the claim that the defendant was deprived of a speedy trial and determined that the test to be applied in assessing the delay was whether he had been denied due process of law. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the defendant had demonstrated neither prejudice nor a delay that was unreasonable or deliberate. (Archerd, supra, 3 Cal.3d 615, 620, 639-640, 643.) In People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal.3d 615, there was an 11-year delay between the first of a series of murders committed by the defendant and the time an indictment was filed against him. The delay was caused by the absence of a scientific test to confirm the suspicion of the police that the defendant had murdered his victims by the injection of insulin. (Archerd, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 620-621.) The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the defendant was denied a speedy trial and due process of law by the pre-indictment delay. (Id. at pp. 639-640.) In Archerd, the defendant made no showing at the trial that any crucial defense was lost by reason of the delay. The prosecution located any material witnesses requested by defendant or stipulated as to what the testimony would be. The prosecution produced evidence to show that there was a reasonable investigation, which commenced with the murder of Zella Archerd, and continued until the scientific breakthrough occurred that could form the foundation for a successful investigation and prosecution to alter all of the medical opinions, which, previously, had thwarted prosecution. (Id. at p. 641.) The California Supreme Court considered what rules should apply when an accused claims there has been an unreasonable delay in arresting and charging him. In Archerd, the Supreme Court held that the speedy trial right had no application to such a claim. As the Supreme Court explained, "One does not become an accused until the filing of a complaint. The provisions of the Sixth Amendment contemplate a pending charge, not the mere possibility of a criminal charge." (Id. at p. 639.) Nevertheless, the Archerd court did find that due process could be violated by a pre-accusation delay. Specifically, if the delay were purposeful, oppressive, and prejudicial to the accused's ability to defend him or her self, it could violate due process. (Id. at p. 640.) As a consequence, the Archerd court established prejudice as an essential element of a due process claim. Furthermore, the Archerd court established that "Prejudice . . . may be shown by the loss of a material witness or other missing evidence or fading memory caused by lapse of time." (Ibid.) In People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal.3d 615, the trial court made its own ex parte inquiries of a physician about insulin, the murder weapon, though the court learned no new facts that had not been presented at trial. In upholding the verdict against the defendant, the Supreme Court explained: "We disapprove the action of the trial judge in consulting experts outside of court. While in this instance the facts of the case were not involved, the extrajudicial inquiry by the judge gave no opportunity to counsel to examine or cross-examine the experts with whom he spoke. However lofty the motivation of the judge in his desire to be informed, the interviewing of potential witnesses anywhere but on the witness stand should be avoided. Despite the error in the conduct of the judge, we do not find the error to be prejudicial." (Ibid.) In People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal.3d 615, the court noted that, under federal and state law, a claim of preindictment delay is analyzed under a due process standard, requiring that the defendant show prejudice from the delay, after which the burden shifts to the People to show the delay was the result of valid police procedure. (Archerd, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 639-640.) It further recognized that "prejudice in either type of delay preindictment or postindictment may be shown by the loss of a material witness or other missing evidence or fading memory caused by lapse of time. If the government deliberately utilizes delay to strengthen its position by weakening that of the defense or otherwise impairs a defendant's right to a fair trial, an inordinate pre-indictment delay may be shown to be prejudicial. A prosecutor is entitled to reasonable time in which to investigate an offense for the purpose of determining whether a prosecution is warranted and also in preparation of a case for submission to the grand jury. The delay must be purposeful, oppressive, and even 'smack of deliberate obstruction on the part of the government,' before relief will be granted. " (Id. at p. 640.) The Court found "the delay was neither unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive or vexatious and was not deliberately caused to harass defendant." (Id. at p. 643.)