People v. Bernal

In People v. Bernal (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 155, the defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and causing great bodily injury. The trial court declined to order restitution to the victim because the defendant's insurance company had paid the victim for her losses, and she had signed a waiver and release of all claims, and the waiver and release specifically listed the defendant himself as a condition of probation. (Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 158-161.) On appeal, the court held that the victim's settlement and release did not abrogate the defendant's restitution obligation. (Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 160-161, 164.) The court noted that under both the state constitution and section 1202.4, the victims of crimes had a right to restitution, and the court was required to order those defendants convicted of crimes to pay restitution for losses suffered by victims regardless of the indemnification or subrogation rights of third parties. (Id. at p. 161) The court further noted that "a restitution order has objectives beyond simply indemnifying the victim. It also seeks to rehabilitate the defendant and deter defendant and others. 'Among other things, California's restitution law ensures that amends are made to society for a breach of the law, serves a rehabilitative purpose, and acts as a deterrent to future criminality. Restitution "is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused. Such a penalty will affect the defendant differently than a traditional fine, paid to the State as an abstract and impersonal entity, and often calculated without regard to the harm the defendant has caused. Similarly, the direct relation between the harm and the punishment gives restitution a more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine; (Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 161-162, quoting People v. Moser (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 130, 135-136.) The court reasoned that "a release by a victim cannot waive the People's right to have a defendant pay restitution ordered as part of his sentence . . . ." (Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 160.) "While a settlement agreement with, and release of, a defendant's insurance company may reflect a victim's willingness to accept the amount paid in full satisfaction for all civil liability, it does not reflect the willingness of the People to accept that sum in satisfaction of the defendant's rehabilitative and deterrent debt to society. A restitution order pursuant to a defendant's plea is an agreement between the defendant and the state. The victim is not party to the agreement, and a release by the victim cannot act to release a defendant from his financial debt to the state any more than it could terminate his prison sentence." (Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 162.) The court also explained that a restitution order "need not mirror what a victim might obtain in a civil action. 'There is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action . . . .' Since the categories of loss recoverable by restitution and the dollar amounts ordered are not identical to the defendant's civil liability, there is no reason that a release of civil liability should release a restitution obligation, just as a satisfied restitution obligation does not bar a civil action for further damages." (Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 162-163.) Furthermore, "even the statutory goal of fully reimbursing the victim's losses might be undermined if a civil settlement with a defendant's insurance carrier barred further restitution. A victim might rationally choose to accept an insurance settlement for substantially less than his or her losses rather than risk the uncertain, or even unlikely, possibility that the defendant will pay the entire restitution amount. If a settlement release automatically terminated a defendant's restitution obligation, the victim would lose all possibility of ever being made whole." (Id. at p. 163.)