In People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 273, 256 Cal. Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610, the defendant had been subjected to more than an hour of intensive interrogation during which the police repeatedly accused him of lying and professed their firm belief he was guilty. He vehemently maintained his innocence and ultimately invoked his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, to silence and counsel. For a significant time, the police ignored his pleas and continued questioning him over his objection. After the interrogation had finally ceased and while he was still in custody, he was fingerprinted. He was then allowed to make a phone call, and the police overheard him state that he thought he was being charged with murder. A police detective then asked the defendant to re-enter the interrogation room. No attorney was present on the defendant's behalf. The detective admonished the defendant that he could not be questioned further in light of his invocation of his Miranda rights, but then launched into a monologue on the status of the investigation. The detective told the defendant that a witness disputed the defendant's claim regarding the last time the defendant had visited the victims' residence. The detective then told the defendant that the defendant was still under suspicion and that the investigation would continue. As the detective turned away, the defendant's will buckled, the defendant called the detective back, and the defendant confessed. (Boyer, at pp. 273-274.) The Supreme Court held that the defendant's statement was the result of the authorities' improper resumption of contact and questioning. (Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 274.) The court explained: "The record discloses no custodial reason why, once defendant had invoked his Miranda right to counsel, it was necessary to approach him again to 'tell him a couple of things' about the investigation. On this basis alone, we must find that defendant's statement contravened the requirements of Miranda. But Detective Lewis did more. His aggressive, prolonged interrogation earlier in the evening was calculated to convince defendant that the police believed him a guilty liar. As Lewis knew, the technique had hit home . . . . The pressures to confess, or to appear innocently cooperative, were thus very strong. Under these circumstances, by confronting defendant once again with a discrepancy in his story, Lewis effectively invited defendant to make an 'incriminating response' . . . ." (Boyer, at pp. 274-275, fn. omitted.) In Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, the People had argued that because the detective gave no opportunity for the defendant to respond to the detective's monologue and had ended the encounter by turning away, the court must deem the defendant to have "'initiated'" a new conversation by calling the detective back. ( Id. at p. 275.) The Supreme Court rejected that contention, stating: "Our concurrence in that view would violate the spirit of Edwards. It would allow circumvention of the prophylactic rule against new approaches by the authorities once the suspect has invoked the suspect's Miranda right to counsel. We decline the People's invitation to characterize the facts as they suggest. Defendant's statement was obtained in violation of Miranda and its progeny. His motion to suppress his statement on that ground should have been granted." (Boyer, at p. 275). The California Supreme Court held that the defendant's interrogation was custodial based on the following circumstances: (1) the police officers read defendant his Miranda rights at the station, a strong indication that they themselves considered the interrogation custodial; (2) the interrogation was "intense" and spanned nearly two hours; (3) during the interrogation, the officers led the defendant to believe that suspicion had focused on him, that they considered him guilty, and that they intended to charge him because they had evidence to prove his guilt in court; (4) the defendant was frisked and brought to the police station by the officers; (5) the officers interrogated the defendant using softening-up tactics and aggressive accusatory questions; (6) the officers evaded the defendant's question of whether he was under arrest; (7) the officers ignored several statements by the defendant that he wanted a lawyer and did not wish to say anything further; (8) the defendant asked if he could make a telephone call later, indicating he believed himself to be in custody. ( Id., at pp. 264-265, 267-268, 272, disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824.) The court concluded that "a reasonable person in such circumstances would only have considered himself under practical arrest. The interrogation was therefore 'custodial,' and the Miranda safeguards applied." (Boyer, supra, at p. 272.)