In People v. Bradford (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 843, a murder prosecution, the evidence, apart from the defendant's statements to police, would have supported any verdict from murder to voluntary manslaughter and was arguably consistent with a claim of self-defense. (Id. at p. 855.) The defendant's statements to police, however, were highly inculpatory, tending to rule out any defense for the killing. (Id. at pp. 849-850.) The defendant took the stand and claimed he acted in self-defense, but the jury rejected the testimony and convicted him of second degree murder. (Id. at p. 850.) The Court found prejudice, noting, "Because of the significant bearing of the confession on the crucial issue of defendant's mental state and the ample evidence that would have supported a finding of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder, we cannot say admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. at p. 855.) In Bradford, the Attorney General argued the statements to police should not be considered prejudicial because they would have been admitted to impeach the defendant's testimony in any event; the defendant responded he would not have testified if not for the need to counter his statements to police. We rejected both arguments, recognizing: "Whether defendant would have testified in the absence of the need to respond to his confession and, if so, whether the confession would have been admitted for purposes of impeachment requires us to engage in speculation about the parties' tactical choices. Because it is impossible to determine what might have happened had the trial proceeded differently, we conclude that prejudice should be evaluated on the basis of the evidence actually presented, while excluding the improperly admitted confession. On this basis, as noted above, we cannot find the confession's admission to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (Bradford, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 855-856.) The appellate court concluded the trial court erred by admitting the defendant's confession. (Id. at p. 855.) The Attorney General argued the error was not prejudicial because "the confession would have been admitted in any event to impeach defendant's testimony." (Ibid.) The appellate court stated, "whether defendant would have testified in the absence of the need to respond to his confession and, if so, whether the confession would have been admitted for purposes of impeachment requires us to engage in speculation about the parties' tactical choices. Because it is impossible to determine what might have happened had the trial proceeded differently, we conclude that prejudice should be evaluated on the basis of the evidence actually presented, while excluding the improperly admitted confession. On this basis, as noted above, we cannot find the confession's admission to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. at pp. 855-856.)