In People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, the California Supreme Court held that despite Proposition 8's Victims' Bill of Rights amendment to the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, 28, subd. (f)), the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demanded that a witness could be impeached with a felony conviction only if the conviction involved moral turpitude. (Castro, at pp. 313-314.) Castro 'divided crimes of moral turpitude into two groups. The first group includes crimes in which dishonesty is an element (i.e., fraud, perjury, etc.). The second group includes crimes that indicate a " 'general readiness to do evil,' " from which a readiness to lie can be inferred.' As Castro explained, it is 'easier to infer that a witness is lying if the felony of which he has been convicted involves dishonesty as a necessary element than when it merely indicates a "bad character" and "general readiness to do evil." Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a witness' moral depravity of any kind has some "tendency in reason" to shake one's confidence in his honesty. . . .There is then some basis -- however tenuous -- for inferring that a person who has committed a crime which involves moral turpitude other than dishonesty is more likely to be dishonest than a witness about whom no such thing is known.' (People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 315) The California Supreme Court held "the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily cuts into the 'without limitation' language of subdivision (f)" (Castro, supra, at p. 314), explaining: "We must ask with respect to any particular felony conviction which is offered for impeachment: 'Can it be said with substantial assurance that the credibility of a witness is adversely affected by his or her having suffered this conviction?' If the answer is 'no,' impeachment is prohibited by due process: 'An important element of a fair trial is that a jury consider only relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence.' ." (Id. at p. 313.) The answer will be "yes" only where the conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude, i.e., a crime that "indicates a 'bad character' and 'general readiness to do evil.'" (Id. at p. 315.) "Obviously it is easier to infer that a witness is lying if the felony of which he or she has been convicted involves dishonesty as a necessary element," but there is also "some basis--however tenuous--for inferring that a person who has committed a crime which involves moral turpitude other than dishonesty is more likely to be dishonest than a witness about whom no such thing is known." (Ibid.) The Court also noted, with regard to the admissibility of felony convictions for impeachment purposes that "it will be necessary to determine with respect to each felony conviction offered for impeachment--difficult though this may prove to be--whether it does or does not involve moral turpitude. If it does not, that is the end of it. If it does, it is prima facie admissible, subject to the exercise of trial court discretion. Naturally, the more tenuous the court finds the connection between the moral defect shown by the conviction and the only defect directly relevant--dishonesty--the more likely it is to disallow impeachment."