People v. Cleveland

In People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, the court first reaffirmed that a trial court has the discretionary power to discharge a juror for " 'good cause shown.' " (Id. at p. 474, quoting Pen. Code, 1089; see Code Civ. Proc., 233, 234.) This power is properly exercised, however, only if grounds for removal " ' "appear in the record as a demonstrable reality." ' " (Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th 466 at p. 474 quoting People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 843, 919 P.2d 1280). The court cited with approval decisions holding that jurors may be discharged for physical or emotional inability to perform their function as jurors, including sleeping during proceedings. (Ibid.) The court also affirmed that jurors may be discharged for refusal to deliberate, while warning that "caution must be exercised in determining" whether this has occurred. (Id. at p. 475.) The court then discussed the considerations, which should guide an initial determination whether to investigate a suggestion of grounds to discharge a juror. The court cited approvingly decisions which "recognized the need to protect the sanctity of jury deliberations" and to " ' "assure[] the privacy of jury deliberations" ' " by " ' "foreclosing intrusive inquiry into the sanctity of jurors' thought processes." ' " (Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th 466 at p. 475 quoting In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294, fn. 17, 975 P.2d 600.) However, the court further recognized that "the need to protect the sanctity of jury deliberations . . . does not preclude reasonable inquiry by the court into allegations of misconduct during deliberations." (Id. at p. 476.) The court went on to acknowledge decisions in which trial courts committed reversible error by failing to inquire sufficiently into suggestions of jury misconduct. (Id. at p. 477.) Implicitly relying on the tension between these competing considerations, and on the infinite variations in fact patterns, the court reaffirmed that " 'the decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct--like the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a juror--rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. As our cases make clear, a hearing is required only where the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would constitute "good cause" to doubt a juror's ability to perform his duties and would justify his removal from the case. " (Id. at p. 478, quoting People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343, 914 P.2d 846.) On the other hand, if the court is "on notice that there may be grounds to discharge a juror during deliberations," and if reinstructing the jurors on their duties fails to resolve the difficulty, then the trial court "must conduct 'whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary to determine' whether such grounds exist." (Id. at p. 480; see id. at p. 484.) The court went on to note that inquiry into possible grounds for discharge "should be as limited in scope as possible, to avoid intruding unnecessarily upon the sanctity of the jury's deliberations. The inquiry should focus upon the conduct of the jurors, rather than upon the content of the deliberations. Additionally, the inquiry should cease once the court is satisfied that the juror at issue is participating in deliberations and has not expressed an intention to disregard the court's instructions or otherwise committed misconduct, and that no other proper ground for discharge exists. The Court also observed that permitting the attorneys for the parties to question deliberating jurors is fraught with peril and generally should not be permitted. Of course, the court may allow counsel to suggest areas of inquiry or specific questions to be posed by the court." (Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th 466 at p. 485.) The court also provided guidance as to what constitutes such a failure or refusal to deliberate as will warrant a juror's discharge: "A refusal to deliberate consists of a juror's unwillingness to engage in the deliberative process; that is, he or she will not participate in discussions with fellow jurors by listening to their views and by expressing his or her own views. Examples of refusal to deliberate include, but are not limited to, expressing a fixed conclusion at the beginning of deliberations and refusing to consider other points of view, refusing to speak to other jurors, and attempting to separate oneself physically from the remainder of the jury. The circumstance that a juror does not deliberate well or relies upon faulty logic or analysis does not constitute a refusal to deliberate and is not a ground for discharge. Similarly, the circumstance that a juror disagrees with the majority of the jury as to what the evidence shows, or how the law should be applied to the facts, or the manner in which deliberations should be conducted does not constitute a refusal to deliberate and is not a ground for discharge. A juror who has participated in deliberations for a reasonable period of time may not be discharged for refusing to deliberate, simply because the juror expresses the belief that further discussion will not alter his or her views." (Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th 466 at p. 485.) In Cleveland, "it became apparent under questioning that the [holdout] juror simply viewed the evidence differently from the way the rest of the jury viewed it." (Ibid.) The Cleveland holdout's distinct view of the evidence did not mean that he was unwilling to apply the law or was otherwise guilty of misconduct. ( Id. at pp. 485-486.)