In People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, defendant contended his federal constitutional right to avoid self-incrimination was violated by the conducting of a hearing on an allegation of probation violation for the same conduct that served as the basis for a separate criminal charge for which he had not yet been tried. (Id. at p. 871.) The high court recognized that probationers who wish to present mitigating evidence during probation violation hearings face a dilemma if their testimonies were subsequently admissible to prove criminal charges. The Coleman court explained that "the deterrent effect of concurrent criminal liability . . . serves to defeat the intelligent and just exercise of the court's broad discretion in a probation revocation proceeding by impairing the accuracy and restricting the scope of the factfinding process. A probationer is by definition a convicted lawbreaker. Insofar as a probationer seeks at a revocation hearing to deny or contradict the evidence of a probation violation, he is generally at a disadvantage in terms of the credibility of his testimony. His testimony is likely to be more readily accepted, and hence more useful to the court, insofar as it adds to rather than detracts from the factual picture presented by the state, through the probationer's explanation of his actions and account of the circumstances surrounding an alleged probation violation. But such mitigating evidence is just what is most likely to be withheld from the court by virtue of the probationer's fear of self-incrimination, since mitigating evidence often involves damaging factual admissions coupled with more or less compelling moral excuses." (Id. at p. 874.) To avoid the necessity for probation violation hearings to follow the criminal trial concerning the same conduct, the Coleman court fashioned the remedy of granting defendants use immunity for their testimony during probation violation hearings. The Coleman court declared "as a judicial rule of evidence that henceforth upon timely objection the testimony of a probationer at a probation revocation hearing held prior to the disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged violation of the conditions of his probation, and any evidence derived from such testimony, is inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges, save for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal where the probationer's revocation hearing testimony or evidence derived therefrom and his testimony on direct examination at the criminal proceeding are so clearly inconsistent as to warrant the trial court's admission of the revocation hearing testimony or its fruits in order to reveal to the trier of fact the probability that the probationer has committed perjury at either the trial or the revocation hearing." (Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 889) Coleman does not address whether the fact of a bare admission of a violation of probation is inadmissible in a subsequent trial on new charges. (See Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 889.) Nonetheless, we conclude that the rule announced in Coleman does not require exclusion of a prior admission of a violation of probation that involved no testimony or explanation by a defendant. As the Coleman court explained, it sought to avoid "the danger of abuse by the state of its opportunity to coerce self-incriminatory testimony by scheduling the probation revocation hearing in advance of trial." (Id. at pp. 888-889, ) The Coleman court further noted, "Even where a violation is proven or admitted, a probationer has a due process right to explain any mitigating circumstances and argue that the ends of justice do not warrant revocation." (Id. at p. 873.) In People v. Coleman (1975) the California Supreme Court declared a judicial rule of evidence that upon timely objection, "the testimony of a probationer at a probation revocation hearing held prior to the disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged violation of the conditions of his probation, and any evidence derived from such testimony, is inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges . . . ." unless it appeared that the probationer had committed perjury. (Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 889.) This rule was necessary to ensure that the state's discretion in scheduling the probation revocation hearing would not be used to gain an unfair advantage at trial, through its opportunity to "coerce self-incriminatory testimony by scheduling the probation revocation hearing in advance of trial." (Id. at pp. 888-889.) As the court stated, "Because of the inapplicability of certain evidentiary rules and the lower standard of proof obtaining at a probation revocation hearing, the People are generally more likely to achieve a probationer's incarceration through the probation revocation process than through the new prosecution and conviction. When a probationer is deterred from testifying at his revocation hearing by fears of self-incrimination at his subsequent trial, the People's chances of securing his incarceration through the revocation proceeding are further enhanced. And if a probationer does successfully fight revocation by testifying at the hearing, the People's chances of securing his conviction of a new offense will have been improved by the probationer's having been forced, in effect, to be one of the prosecution's principal witnesses in its case in chief at his trial." (Id. at pp. 876-877.) The risks were particularly acute because in a probation revocation hearing, a probationer's best approach might be to explain the mitigating circumstances surrounding the charged probation violation. (Id. at p. 878.)