In People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, the California Supreme Court recognized that a probationer may be deterred from testifying at his or her formal revocation hearing when a trial is pending, and announced a judicial rule of evidence that permits probationers, upon objection, to bar the admission of their revocation hearing testimony at trial. In view of this rule, the court held that the trial court has the discretion to conduct the formal revocation hearing before the trial, but cautioned that the opposite sequence of proceedings is ordinarily preferable. (Id. at pp. 888, 897.) The Supreme Court reaffirmed these conclusions in People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 932-935. In People v. Coleman (1975) the defendant contended that a hearing on revocation of probation in advance of trial on criminal charges denied him procedural due process by forcing him to forego his opportunity to testify on his own behalf at the revocation hearing in order to avoid incriminating himself at the pending criminal trial. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to adjudicate the constitutional claim because it concluded that the choice facing probationers could be eliminated by a judicially declared rule of evidence that upon timely objection the testimony of a probationer at a probation revocation hearing and any evidence derived from such testimony is inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges. An exception was made for impeachment purposes "where the probationer's revocation hearing testimony or evidence derived therefrom and his testimony on direct examination at the criminal proceeding are so clearly inconsistent as to warrant the trial court's admission of the revocation hearing testimony or its fruits in order to reveal to the trier of fact the probability that the probationer has committed perjury at either the trial or the revocation hearing." (13 Cal.3d at p. 889.) The Supreme Court reasoned that "a fundamental requisite of due process is the meaningful opportunity to be heard and to explain one's actions." A probationer has a due process right to explain any mitigating circumstances and to argue that the ends of justice do not warrant revocation; his testimony is likely to be useful to the court, adding to the factual picture presented by the state "through the probationer's explanation of his actions and account of the circumstances surrounding an alleged probation violation. But such mitigating evidence is just what is most likely to be withheld from the court by virtue of the probationer's fear of self-incrimination, since mitigating evidence often involves damaging factual admissions coupled with more or less compelling moral excuses." (13 Cal.3d at p. 874.) The California Supreme Court stated: "Trial courts should bear in mind that even when a probationer has been duly convicted of a new crime, he is entitled to a formal revocation hearing before his probation is revoked and sentence is imposed on the prior offense. . . . It is true that a conviction conclusively establishes the fact of a certain course of conduct by the person convicted. All that need be demonstrated to establish that a violation of probation has occurred is the fact of a new, post-probation conviction, the fact that such conviction or the conduct necessarily involved therein violated a condition of probation, and the further fact that such conviction was suffered by the particular probationer in question. It does not follow, however, that these facts will necessarily be undisputed by a probationer alleged to have been convicted of a new offense. Moreover, when a court passes on the ultimate issue of whether probation is to be revoked, the court must decide more than merely whether, in light of an alleged conviction for a new offense, a violation of probation has occurred. If such be the case, the court must go on to decide whether under all the circumstances this violation of probation warrants revocation. A probationer has a right to be heard and to present evidence on this issue as well as on the threshold issue of whether his probation has in fact been violated, and a probationer thus has a right to a formal revocation hearing notwithstanding his prior conviction of a new offense. The fact of the new conviction does not ipso facto render 'the attending circumstances . . . factually undisputed' or leave as 'the only matter in issue . . . the legal consequences of an undisputed course of conduct' such that the court may 'without hearing any witness, rule on the matter' of the revocation of probation. Thus, 'summary resolution of the issue of revocation' [citation] is not appropriate following a probationer's conviction of a new offense unless the probationer waives his right to a formal revocation hearing." (Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 895, fn. 22.)