In People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, the court discussed the circumstances under which a waiver of jury trial could be considered invalid. In that case, on the day set for jury trial, the defendant's counsel informed the trial court that he had discussed with the defendant the possibility of his waiving a jury trial. The court asked the defendant if he wished to waive jury trial and the defendant stated that he wished to " 'waive.' " (Id. at p. 301.) The court then proceeded to advise the defendant of his right to jury trial and to explain what he would be giving up if he chose to go to trial before the court. The defendant indicated he understood his rights and still intended to waive jury trial. When the court asked the defendant if he understood that he was not " 'gaining any promises of leniency or anything else relative to the waiver,' " defendant responded negatively. (Id. at p. 302.) The defendant informed the court that he was told the waiver of jury trial " 'was some reassurance or some type of benefit.' " (Ibid.) The court told defendant that it had informed defendant's counsel that the waiver might well be tied to a benefit, because it would not then take up two weeks of the court's time to try the case. The court would not specify the exact nature of the benefit, but indicated that by waiving a jury the defendant was getting some benefit. The defendant replied that he understood and waived his right to jury trial. (Id. at pp. 302-303.) The Collins court held that "the waiver of a jury trial obtained by a trial court's assurance of an unspecified benefit is not a valid waiver, and that this error compels reversal of the defendant's conviction." (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 300.) The court noted that it had long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court that "the state may not punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right, or promise leniency to a defendant for refraining from the exercise of that right." (Id. at p. 306.) It then reasoned, "the trial court, upon informing the defendant that he would receive a benefit of an unspecified nature in the event he waived his right to trial by jury, secured the defendant's response that he understood. The court made these representations and offers to the defendant prior to determining that his waiver of the right to jury trial was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The form of the trial court's negotiation with the defendant presented a 'substantial danger of unintentional coercion.' In addition, the objective of the trial court's comments was to obtain the defendant's waiver of a fundamental constitutional right that, by itself (when defendant elects to go to trial), is not subject to negotiation by the court. In effect, the trial court offered to reward the defendant for refraining from the exercise of a constitutional right. The circumstance that the trial court did not specify the nature of the benefit by making a promise of a particular mitigation in sentence, or other reward, does not negate the coercive effect of the court's assurances. The inducement offered by the trial court to the defendant, to persuade him to waive his fundamental right to a jury trial, violated the defendant's right to due process of law." (Id. at p. 309, fn. omitted.) However, the Collins court noted that benefits that are offered to a defendant by a prosecutor in the course of plea negotiations, in which constitutional rights are relinquished, do not necessarily render the waiver of those constitutional rights involuntary or otherwise unconstitutional. "We do not intend by our holding today to call into question the well-established practice in which the prosecutor and the defendant negotiate a plea of guilty or nolo contendre , a practice that obviously involves a relinquishment of the constitutional rights attending a trial, including the right to trial by jury. As the high court has explained in examining the prerogative of the state, through the prosecutor, to offer such a plea: 'Not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right is invalid. Specifically, there is no per se rule against encouraging guilty pleas. We have squarely held that a State may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea,' which may obtain for the defendant ' "the possibility or certainty . . . not only of a lesser penalty than the sentence that could be imposed after a trial and a verdict of guilty . . ." , but also of a lesser penalty than that required to be imposed after a guilty verdict by a jury.' " (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 309-310, fn. 4.) In People v. Collins (2001) "At the outset the trial court indicated that previously, upon learning that defendant might waive jury trial, the court had informed defense counsel that 'there might well be a benefit in it,' because 'just by having waived jury' and thus not taking two weeks' time to try the case, 'that has some effect on the court.' Subsequently the trial court, upon informing defendant that he would receive a benefit of an unspecified nature in the event he waived his right to trial by jury, secured defendant's response that he understood. The court made these representations and offers to defendant prior to determining that his waiver of the right to jury trial was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." (Id. at p. 309.) There is no indication the prosecutor objected to the court's statements. The California Supreme Court held the trial court's conduct "was at odds with its judicial obligation to remain neutral and detached in evaluating the voluntariness of the waiver" and "presented a 'substantial danger of unintentional coercion,'" in violation of the defendant's right to due process of law. (Id. at p. 309.)