In People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, a capital case, "the trial lasted over three months. Dozens of witnesses testified, some about complex scientific testing. Well over 700 exhibits were admitted into evidence." (Ibid.) The jury deliberated for 27 hours over seven court days. The court held: "It is not surprising that the deliberations were protracted. . . . The length of the deliberations demonstrates nothing more than that the jury was conscientious in its performance of high civic duty." (Ibid.) The Court held that 'a getaway driver who has no prior knowledge of a robbery, but who forms the intent to aid in carrying away the loot during such asportation, may properly be found liable as an aider and abettor of the robbery.' (Id. at p. 1161.) The court reasoned that 'the commission of robbery continues so long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary safety.' (Id. at p. 1170.) In Cooper, the court commented: 'The logic of viewing "committed" as a fixed point in time for purposes of guilt-establishment and "commission" as a temporal continuum for purposes of determining accomplice liability can be seen from the perspective of both the victim and the accomplice. The rape victim, for example, would not agree that the crime was completed once the crime was initially committed (i.e., at the point of initial penetration). Rather, the offense does not end until all of the acts that constitute the rape have ceased. Furthermore, the unknowing defendant who happens on the scene of a rape after the rape has been initially committed and aids the perpetrator in the continuing criminal acts is an accomplice under this concept of "commission," because he formed his intent to facilitate the commission of the rape during its commission.' In People v. Cooper (1991) the jury reviewed a transcript relating to an earlier prosecution which referred to the defendant's complaints of headaches and hallucinations. The exhibit had been inadvertently admitted into evidence at the defendant's request. (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 834.) Once alerted to the problem, the court struck the transcript, admonished the jury not to consider it, and questioned each juror individually regarding possible prejudice. (Ibid.) On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the jury did nothing improper because the transcript had been admitted into evidence. (Id. at p. 835.) It explained that "the fact that the evidence was inadvertently admitted and then withdrawn did not elevate the error to one of misconduct." (Id. at p. 836.) In People v. Cooper (1991) the California Supreme Court was confronted with the question whether the jury instruction on the escape rule (former CALJIC Nos. 9.15 & 9.44, now CALCRIM No. 3261) was erroneously given in the trial of a defendant charged with aiding and abetting a robbery. The jury in Cooper was instructed as follows: "'The commission of the crime of robbery is not confined to a fixed place or a limited period of time. A robbery is still in progress after the original taking of physical possession of the stolen property while the perpetrator is in hot flight, that is, while in possession of the stolen property he is fleeing in an attempt to escape. Likewise, it is still in progress so long as he is still being immediately pursued in an attempt to capture him or regain the stolen property. A robbery is complete when the perpetrator has eluded his pursuers, if any; has reached a place of temporary safety and is in unchallenged possession of the stolen property after having effected an escape with such property.' (CALJIC No. 9.44 (5th ed.) former CALJIC No. 9.15 (4th ed.), )" (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1170.) In deciding that the instruction should not have been given in that context, the court reasoned that "it could have misled the jury into believing that commission of a robbery continues during the escape to a place of temporary safety even if the loot is not being carried away contemporaneously." (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1170.) The court also recognized it had "never . . . applied the escape rule in contexts other than the construction of statutes concerning certain ancillary consequences of robbery." (Id. at pp. 1166-1167.) In this regard, Cooper reiterates the settled proposition that the asportation of stolen property ends once the thief no longer has his or her loot, and that any force arising thereafter may constitute an assault yet does not elevate the theft to a robbery. That court also recognized that the trial court's error in effectively instructing the jury to the contrary was subject to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of review. (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1170-1171.) The error was deemed harmless because it was undisputed that the act of carrying away the loot to a place of temporary safety coincided with the escape, the prosecution did not argue to the contrary, and there was no evidence to support such a theory. (Id. at p. 1171.)