In People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, defendant's wife called 911 and reported to the operator that defendant hit her and repeated the accusation to a police officer and medical personnel who responded to the call. At the preliminary hearing, defendant's wife claimed her prior accusations were false, and she refused to testify at trial. The trial court found the wife's initial statements to the 911 operator were not testimonial under Crawford and admitted her statements as spontaneous declarations. (Id. at pp. 464-465.) Corella, which was decided prior to Davis, anticipated much of the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in that case, and held the wife's statements to the 911 operator were not testimonial under Crawford. Corella noted the wife's statements were not "'knowingly given in response to structured police questioning,' and bear no indicia common to the official and formal quality of the various statements deemed testimonial by Crawford. Defendant's wife, not the police, initiated the 911 call to request assistance. . . . Not only is a victim making a 911 call in need of assistance, but the 911 operator is determining the appropriate response. The operator is not conducting a police interrogation in contemplation of a future prosecution." (Corella, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 468.) In People v. Corella (2004) the victim called 9-1-1 immediately after the defendant had hit her. Sometime later (the opinion does not specify the time elapse), a police officer responded to the scene. (Id. at p. 465.) The victim, who was crying and distraught, told the officer that the defendant had punched her several times on various parts of her body. (Ibid.) The trial court admitted the victim's statements to the officer as spontaneous statements under Evidence Code section 1240. (Corella, supra, at p. 464.) On appeal, defendant argued that the admission of the victim's statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation as interpreted by Crawford. (Corella, supra, at p. 465.) The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's argument. It reasoned that even though Crawford included responses to "police interrogation" in its definition of testimonial statements, the "spontaneous statements made by the victim describing what had just happened did not become part of a police interrogation merely because Officer Diaz was an officer and obtained information from her." (Corella, supra, at p. 469.) The court explained that "preliminary questions asked at the scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred do not rise to the level of an 'interrogation'" and that "such an unstructured interaction between officer and witness bears no resemblance to a formal or informal police inquiry that is required for a police 'interrogation' as that term is used in Crawford." (Ibid.) Turning to the nature of spontaneous statements generally, the Corella court stated that "it is difficult to identify any circumstances under which an Evidence Code section 1240 spontaneous statement would be 'testimonial'" because "statements made without reflection or deliberation are not made in contemplation of their 'testimonial' use in a future trial." (Corella, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 469)