In People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, a jury convicted the defendant of, inter alia, a nonforcible violation of section 288, subdivision (a), and found that he personally inflicted great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (a)). (Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 63.) The defendant impregnated his stepdaughter who obtained an abortion with the defendant's encouragement. (Id. at pp. 61-62.) Cross rejected the defendant's contention that "a pregnancy without medical complications . . . can never support a finding of great bodily injury." (Id. at pp. 63-66.) Cross found that the evidence of the pregnancy under the circumstances supported the great bodily injury finding. (Id. at p. 66.) Cross determined that the trial court's error in instructing that an abortion could also constitute great bodily injury (defendant did not "personally" perform the abortion) was a technical error. (Id. at pp. 66-67.) Cross also rejected the defendant's claim that the prosecutor's arguments misled the jury to conclude that in facilitating the abortion, the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. (Id. at pp. 67-69.) In discussing the meaning of great bodily injury, Cross stated: "Proof that a victim's bodily injury is 'great' -- that is, significant or substantial within the meaning of section 12022.7 -- is commonly established by evidence of the severity of the victim's physical injury, the resulting pain, or the medical care required to treat or repair the injury." (Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 66.) The California Supreme Court held that a pregnancy without medical complications that results from unlawful but nonforcible sexual conduct with a minor can support a finding of great bodily injury. (Id. at p. 61.) The court explained that "when victims of unlawful sexual conduct experience physical injury and accompanying pain beyond that 'ordinarily experienced' by victims of like crimes, such additional, 'gratuitous injury' will support a finding of great bodily injury." (Id. at p. 66.) In Cross, after noting that the 13-year-old victim's fetus was 22 weeks old and the size of "two-and-a-half softballs," the court concluded: "We need not decide in this case whether every pregnancy resulting from unlawful sexual conduct, forcible or otherwise, will invariably support a factual determination that the victim has suffered a significant or substantial injury, within the language of section 12022.7. But we conclude that here, based solely on the evidence of the pregnancy, the jury could reasonably have found that 13-year-old K. suffered a significant or substantial physical injury." (Id. at p. 66.) In a concurring opinion, J. Baxter added that, although the majority correctly observed that the abortion itself could not support a finding of personal infliction of great bodily injury because the defendant did not personally perform the abortion, the circumstances of the abortion could properly be considered in assessing the gravity of the pregnancy injury. (Id. at p. 69.)