In People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, the court concluded the prosecution presented prima facie evidence in the form of a clear, presumptively reliable official record of defendant's prior conviction, and the defendant produced no rebuttal evidence. (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) The Delgado court stated that, "utilizing the presumption of official duty, and drawing reasonable inferences from the official record, the trial court, as a rational trier of fact, could thus properly find beyond reasonable doubt that a prior serious felony conviction had occurred." (Ibid.) Defendant does not respond to this argument in his reply brief, indicating concession on this point. In Delgado, the defendant argued that an abbreviated entry in the abstract of judgment was insufficient, standing alone, to prove that his prior conviction for a section 245, subdivision (a)(1), offense was in fact for assault with a deadly weapon rather than merely assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, the alternative possibility under the statute. (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1065.) The distinction is important because assault with a deadly weapon is a serious felony, which counts as a "strike" and doubles the sentence for the current offense. Conviction for assault with a deadly weapon also subjects the defendant to a consecutive term, while assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury does not. (Ibid.) The entry in the Delgado defendant's abstract of judgment described his prior conviction as section "'245(A)(1),'" the crime of "'Asslt w DWpn.'" (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1064.) In affirming the appellate court's decision that the conviction was a "strike," the Supreme Court noted that the abstract of judgment is a "contemporaneous, statutorily sanctioned, officially prepared clerical record of the conviction and sentence . . . cloaked with a presumption of regularity and reliability." (Id. at p. 1070.) "Absent any rebuttal evidence, the court could reasonably infer that the words were there for a reason, that they meant what they said, and that they accurately set forth the form of violation for which the defendant was convicted." (Id. at p. 1071.)