In People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, the Supreme Court addressed an issue concerning the proper procedure in determining a strike where the prosecutor uses a section 969b package to prove that the alleged prior convictions constitute violent or serious felonies. It observed that the offense proscribed in section 245, subdivision (a)(1), punishes assault committed either by means of force "'likely to produce great bodily injury'" (GBI) or by the use of a "'deadly weapon . . . other than a firearm.'" Only the latter version qualifies as a serious felony pursuant to section 1192.7, subdivision (c). (Delgado, supra, at pp. 1063, 1065.) Section 1192.7, subdivision (c), does not include a violation of section 245 as an enumerated felony. Rather, it provides for conduct that may qualify a particular conviction as a prior serious felony conviction. Section 1192.7 provides in pertinent part, as follows: "(c) As used in this section, 'serious felony' means any of the following: . . . (23) any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; . . . (31) assault with a deadly weapon, firearm, . . . in violation of Section 245 . . ." The issue in Delgado was whether a court clerk's notation in the abstract of judgment as to the nature of the section 245 violation alone--"'Asslt w DWpn'"--constituted sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of a prior serious felony conviction. The court explained the following. The "'trier of fact is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from certified records offered to prove a defendant suffered a prior conviction . . . .' 'Official government records clearly describing a prior conviction presumptively establish that the conviction in fact occurred, assuming those records meet the threshold requirements of admissibility. (See Evid. Code, 664 "It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.") Some evidence must rebut this presumption before the authenticity, accuracy, or sufficiency of the prior conviction records can be called into question.' "Thus, if the prosecutor presents, by such certified prison records, prima facie evidence of a prior conviction that satisfies the elements of the recidivist enhancement at issue, and if there is no contrary evidence, the fact finder, utilizing the official duty presumption, may determine that a qualifying conviction occurred. " (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1066.) However, "if the prior conviction was for an offense that can be committed in multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the offense was committed, a court must presume the conviction was for the least serious form of the offense. In such a case, if the statute under which the prior conviction occurred could be violated in a way that does not qualify for the alleged enhancement, the evidence is thus insufficient, and the People have failed in their burden. " (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1066.) The Delgado court concluded that the descriptions of a crime found in the abstract of judgment are reliable indicators of the nature of the offense of which a defendant has been convicted. (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1070-1072.) It also discussed three other Court of Appeal decisions that had previously addressed similar issues. The Supreme Court then applied the usual standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to the abstracts of judgment submitted as proof to the Delgado trial court. (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1067.) It held that the description of the felonious assault conviction in the abstract of judgment as a violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and "'Asslt w DWpn'" unambiguously provided prima facie proof that the assault was committed with deadly weapon. (Delgado, supra, at p.1069.) The court noted that at trial, the defendant did not attempt to rebut such proof. Accordingly, the Delgado court found that the clerk's notation was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of a prior serious felony conviction. It explained: "The People therefore presented prima facie evidence, in the form of a clear, presumptively reliable official record of defendant's prior conviction, that the conviction was for the serious felony of assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant produced no rebuttal evidence. Utilizing the presumption of official duty, and drawing reasonable inferences from the official record, the trial court, as a rational trier of fact, could thus properly find beyond reasonable doubt that a prior serious felony conviction had occurred." (Id. at p. 1070.) The Court merely recognized that the crime of aggravated assault under section 245, subdivision (a)(1), can be committed in two different ways, only one of which (assault with a deadly weapon) qualifies as a serious felony under the three strikes law. (Id. at pp. 1065, 1069.) This holding does nothing to undermine the court's prior pronouncements that subdivision (a)(1) of section 245 defines only the single offense of aggravated assault. Indeed, the court went on to effectively acknowledge that a single count of conviction under section 245, subdivision (a)(1), may be based on "one, the other, or both, of the statutory forms of offense . . . ." (Id. at p. 1070, fn. 4.) In People v. Delgado (2008), the California Supreme Court explained the presumption of regularity and reliability (Evid. Code, 664) attending a court clerk's preparation of the abstract of judgment meant the trial court could infer the notation "'Asslt w DWpn'" was not mere surplusage to the notation "'PC'" "'245(a)(1),'" but instead accurately reflected the manner in which defendant committed the offense. (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1069, 1070.) Delgado also noted "an accusatory pleading may specify that a charged offense involves facts making the offense a serious felony. . . . By this means as well, the serious felony nature of the offense will become an explicit part of the record of conviction, leaving no room for confusion if and when the issue becomes relevant to the sentence for a subsequent felony." (Id. at p. 1072.)