In People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 580 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 927 P.2d 310, a software developer, Borland International (Borland), suspected a former employee of conveying internal information to a competitor, Symantec Corporation (Symantec). Search warrants were obtained, but the district attorney's office lacked personnel with the expertise to search Symantec's computers and asked Borland to provide employees to assist. Borland did not want its employees exposed to Symantec secrets and suggested that independent consultants be used. Borland hired and paid one specialist, and the district attorney's office hired another. Borland agreed to pay for the services of the district attorney's specialist and did so after his bill was submitted to the district attorney and forwarded to Borland. The district attorney agreed to the procedure in part because the office was experiencing serious budgetary constraints in the fund used to pay professional and special witnesses. It also appeared that Borland paid a private service to transcribe audiotaped interviews of Borland employees after being told the investigation would be delayed indefinitely due to a clerical backlog in the district attorney's office. Ultimately, the former Borland employee and an officer of Symantec were charged with criminal offenses. Concluding that Borland's funding of the district attorney's investigation created a conflict of interest, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to disqualify the district attorney from prosecuting the case. The Court of Appeal reversed, and the Supreme Court granted review. ( Id. at pp. 584-588.) Eubanks phrased the issue as "whether a crime victim's payment of substantial investigative expenses already incurred by the public prosecutor creates a disabling conflict of interest for the prosecutor, requiring his or her disqualification." (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at p. 588.) The controlling authority is Penal Code section 1424, which establishes procedures for a motion to disqualify the district attorney and which provides in pertinent part: "The motion shall not be granted unless it is shown by the evidence that a conflict of interest exists such as would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial." (See Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at p. 591.) This establishes a two-part test: (1) whether there is a conflict of interest; (2) if so, whether the conflict is so severe as to disqualify the district attorney. ( Id. at p. 594.) A conflict exists whenever there is a reasonable possibility that the district attorney's office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner. The conflict is disabling only if it is so grave as to render it unlikely the defendant will receive fair treatment. (Ibid.) In People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 580, 927 P.2d 310, a company that was concerned about trade secret theft by one of its executives and a rival company sought assistance from the police and district attorney. The investigation required computer experts. When the district attorney indicated he did not have the budget to hire an expert, the victim company indicated it would provide funding to do so. The district attorney hired two experts, and the victim paid for them. The defense sought recusal on that ground and the trial court granted it, finding a conflict existed which gave rise to a reasonable possibility the district attorney might not prosecute the case evenhandedly. The Court of Appeal reversed on the ground no conflict existed and even if one did, it was, as a matter of law, not prejudicial. (People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at pp. 584-588.) The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It found a conflict existed, and the trial court could have found prejudice had it used the correct standard of prejudice. The Supreme Court announced the standard of review is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding the motion. (People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at pp. 594-595.) The court noted Penal Code section 1424 involves a two-prong analysis: (1) whether a "conflict exists," and (2) whether the conflict is prejudicial. As to the first prong, a conflict exists "'whenever the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the district attorney's office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner. Thus, there is no need to determine whether a conflict is "actual" or only gives an "appearance" of conflict.'" (People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at p. 592.) In Eubanks, our high court explained that recusal was warranted there because the conflict placed the discretionary decisionmaking power of the prosecutor within the victim's influence and control. (People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at p. 599.) The peculiar factual factors which supported recusal were findings the prosecutor solicited the victim to satisfy a debt already incurred, the victim's contribution was fairly large in comparison to the prosecutor's budget, and the case was perceived by the trial court as factually weak. (Id. at p. 600.)