In People v. Garrido (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 359, defendant pled guilty following denial of her motion to suppress evidence without renewing the motion in the superior court. (Garrido, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 361, 363.) On appeal, defendant argued that despite her failure to raise the issue in superior court, she was still entitled to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress evidence pursuant to an understanding she had with the deputy district attorney assigned to her case. (Id. at p. 366.) However, there was no evidence of any discussion or specific assurances made regarding the appeal of the ruling on the motion to suppress evidence. (Id. at p. 365.) The Court of Appeal held that defendant had failed to renew the motion to suppress evidence in the superior court as required by section 1538.5, subdivision (m), and that she was not being denied the benefit of her plea agreement. (Garrido, at p. 367.) After concluding that the defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 because she had failed to renew her motion to suppress in the superior court, this court considered whether the defendant's plea agreement provided her with a right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress pursuant to People v. Burns (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1266. In rejecting this argument, the Garrido court noted that "the only information in the record relating to an appeal is that Garrido did cross out the portion of the change of plea form relating to her waiver of the right to appeal and that, at the change of plea hearing, the deputy district attorney did ask for a waiver of her right to appeal." (Garrido, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 367.) After observing that defense counsel's refusal to waive her client's right to appeal was not related to the suppression motion, the Garrido court commented that "there is no reason to believe that Garrido's right to appeal the ruling on the suppression motion was contemplated by the plea agreement nor is there any way of knowing what Garrido understood." (Ibid.) The Court concluded that Garrido had not been denied the benefit of her plea agreement, reasoning, "Rather than guaranteeing Garrido an additional right to appeal, it appears the district attorney's office acquiesced to Garrido's retaining her ordinary rights to appeal." (Ibid.) In sum:The defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress at a conference before the preliminary examination. (Id. at p. 362.) Later that same day, the defendant pled guilty before the magistrate, and the case was certified to the superior court for sentencing. (Id. at pp. 362-363.) At the sentencing hearing, the court suspended imposition of sentence and granted the defendant probation. (Id. at p. 361.) When the defendant sought appellate review of the magistrate's denial of her suppression motion, Division One of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District concluded that " People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891 continues to apply postunification because the California Constitution, former article VI, section 23, subdivision (c) ... specifically provides for superior court review of preliminary hearing suppression motions. The rationale for continuing to apply Lilienthal after unification is based on the distinct roles assigned to the magistrate and the superior court." (People v. Garrido, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 364.)