In People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, the defendant had assaulted and killed a hotel manager in a guest room 107 feet from the office and living area from which the defendant then took cigarettes and cash. (Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 628-629.) The court reversed the defendant's robbery conviction because of prejudicial instructional error but nonetheless found that a "reasonable finder of fact could conclude . . . that the property was not so distant as to be beyond the victim's control and protection . . . ." (Id. at p. 629.) The court in People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 440, stated the principle another way, holding that "the zone of immediate presence includes the area 'within which the victim could reasonably be expected to exercise some physical control over his property.'" In that case, the court held that the immediate presence element could be met when the murder scene was a quarter mile from the stolen vehicle because "there was no evidence that the victim was too far away to perceive and resist an attempt to seize the vehicle." (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court stated that " ' "a thing is in the immediate presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is so within his reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it." ' ." (Id. at pp. 626-627, last brackets added.) Thus, "immediate presence" is " ' "an area within which the victim could reasonably be expected to exercise some physical control over the property." ' " (Id. at p. 627.) The Hayes court concluded that the immediate presence requirement in a robbery case could reasonably be deemed satisfied when the victim was assaulted and killed 107 feet away from the motel office from which property was later taken. (Id. at pp. 628-629, 631.) The court reasoned: "The distance between these two locations . . . was not so great that the manager would necessarily have been unable to see or hear an attempt to break into the office or to return to the office in time to resist such an attempt." (Id. at p. 631.) In People v. Hayes (1990), the defendant raised the issue of "whether, when a witness's testimony may have been influenced by multiple . . . motives to fabricate, a prior consistent statement is admissible if made before the existence of any one or more of the alleged . . . motives to fabricate or only if made before the existence of all such . . . motives." (Id. at p. 609.) When the witness was impeached by evidence that criminal charges were pending against him at the time he testified, the trial court ruled that, under section 791, the witness's consistent statement made prior to the filing of the charges was admissible to rebut the impeachment. (Ibid.) The defendant contended the trial court erred, in that, when the witness gave the prior statement, he had other motives to fabricate arising from the facts that he was on probation and also a suspect in the same motel robbery and murder for which the defendant was being tried. (Ibid.) The Hayes court disagreed, citing its decision in another case "that a prior consistent statement is admissible if it was made before the existence of any one or more of the . . . motives that, according to the opposing party's express or implied charge, may have influenced the witness's testimony." (Ibid.)