People v. Heath

In People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, Heath admitted committing a burglary. His defense was that his drug dealer (Sodersten) threatened to kill him if he did not commit the burglary. According to Heath, he owed Sodersten $ 400 for cocaine he had purchased from Sodersten. The night before the burglary, Heath, Sodersten, and another man drove around in Sodersten's truck for hours drinking and taking drugs. Thereafter, Sodersten started talking about Heath committing a burglary to repay him. Sodersten drove to a residence, pointed a loaded gun at Heath, and threatened to kill him and throw his body into a ditch if he refused to commit the burglary. Heath walked toward the house, threw a planter through the window, saw that Sodersten and the other man were watching him, and committed the burglary. Heath was apprehended by police after exiting the broken window. (Id. at p. 896.) The trial court gave the standard duress instruction and a second instruction which erroneously conflated the defenses of duress and necessity. (Id. at pp. 896-897.) In clarifying the distinctions between the duress and necessity defenses, the appellate court explained that the duress defense exists when a defendant responds to an immediate and imminent danger. "The person being threatened has no time to formulate what is a reasonable and viable course of conduct nor to formulate criminal intent." (Id. at p. 900.) "Thus, duress negates an element of the crime charged--the intent or capacity to commit the crime--and the defendant need raise only a reasonable doubt that he acted in the exercise of his free will." (Ibid.) In contrast, the necessity defense comes into play when the threatened harm is in the immediate future and the defendant has time to balance alternative courses of conduct. (Id. at pp. 900-901.) The Heath court concluded both instructions on both duress and necessity were warranted by the evidence. It reasoned Heath "was first subject to an immediate and imminent threat to his life" when Sodersten held the loaded gun to his head inside the truck. (Id. at p. 902.) However, once outside Sodersten's immediate presence, "the threat became one in the immediate future allowing Heath an opportunity . . . to balance his options." (Ibid.) The defendant admitted committing a burglary. According to Heath, he and his drug dealer, Sodersten, and another man drove around for hours drinking and taking drugs in Sodersten's truck. Heath owed Sodersten money, and at approximately 3:00 a.m., Sodersten said Heath could commit a burglary to repay him. (Id. at p. 896.) Sodersten drove Heath to a residence, pointed a loaded gun at him, and threatened to kill him and throw his body into a ditch if he refused to commit the burglary. Heath walked toward the house, threw a planter through the window, observed that Sodersten and the other man were watching him, and committed the burglary. After he was in the house for approximately 15 minutes, police apprehended him. (Id. at pp. 896-897.) The trial court instructed with the standard duress instruction, as well as a special instruction on "the defense of justification or duress." (People v. Heath, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 896.) The appellate court agreed the second instruction was erroneous in that it conflated the two doctrines. (Id. at p. 901.) The defense of duress, Heath reasoned, comes into play only when a defendant responds to an immediate and imminent danger. (Id. at p. 900.) The intent element of the crime is negated because the defendant has no time to formulate a course of conduct or criminal intent. (Ibid.) The defense of necessity, in contrast, is founded upon public policy and provides a justification for the crime, but does not negate any element of the crime. (Id. at p. 901.) "Unlike duress, the threatened harm is in the immediate future, which contemplates the defendant having time to balance alternative courses of conduct." (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded instructions on both defenses were warranted in Heath. The defendant "was first subject to an immediate and imminent threat to his life" when Sodersten held the loaded gun to his head in the truck. When Heath exited the car and entered the house, he was no longer subject to the same imminent harm as he had been in the truck; instead, "the threat became one in the immediate future allowing appellant an opportunity, albeit brief, to balance his options, which is the very essence of the necessity defense." (Id. at p. 902.) Heath concluded that although the trial court erred by conflating the two defenses, the error was harmless. (Id. at pp. 901-902.)