In People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, officers arrived at the defendant's residence about 3:20 p.m. to execute an arrest warrant. They arrived in plain clothes and an unmarked car. (Id. at pp. 476, 479.) The officers believed that the defendant would be home because they had information he was "not employed at a daytime job." (Id. at p. 478.) When they arrived, the defendant's 11-year-old stepdaughter opened the door; the officers went into the house. (Id. at p. 476.) The stepdaughter told the officers that the defendant was not home and would be home in about one hour. Based on those facts, the defendant argued that the officers unlawfully entered his home because they did not have reasonable grounds to believe he was inside the home. (Ibid.) The court agreed with the defendant, it stated: "If the officers had a hunch or a hope defendant would be home, the evidence indicates it was dispelled before they entered the house. They arrived in plain clothes and an unmarked car, and there is no suggestion defendant perceived their arrival and fled or hid. Defendant's vehicles were nowhere in sight. When they asked the stepdaughter if defendant was home, she told them he would be back in an hour. The evidence does not suggest that the stepdaughter's response or behavior further aroused the officers' suspicions." (Id. at p. 479.) The Court analyzed the question of whether a minor may consent to a police search of her parents' home. The court held that the 11-year-old child lacked authority to permit plain clothes police officers to enter and search the home while her parents were away. (Id. at pp. 481-482.) The court reasoned, "Minor children ... do not have coequal dominion over the family home. Although parents may choose to grant their minor children joint access and mutual use of the home, parents normally retain control of the home as well as the power to rescind the authority they have given. 'It does not startle us that a parent's consent to a search of the living room in the absence of his minor child is given effect; but we should not allow the police to rely on the consent of the child to bind the parent. The common sense of the matter is that the ... parent has not surrendered his privacy of place in the living room to the discretion of the ... child; rather, the latter has privacy of place there in the discretion of the former.' " (Id. at p. 482.) In Jacobs, the court acknowledged that "as a child advances in age she acquires greater discretion to admit visitors on her own authority. In some circumstances, a teenager may possess sufficient authority to allow the police to enter and look about common areas." (Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 483.) However, the court reasoned that "an entry based on the unauthorized consent of an 11-year-old child ... frustrates the objectives of section 844. It violates the privacy rights of the parents and increases the likelihood that an adult occupant will be startled by the apparently unauthorized intrusion and react violently out of concern for the safety of the child." (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court clarified that a minor's authority over the family home derives from the parents' authority as the primary legal possessors. (Ibid.) In short, the police went to the defendant's home and, finding him gone, persuaded his 11- year-old stepdaughter to permit them to search the house. In ruling the search invalid on the grounds the child could not give valid consent, the court noted, "Minor children ... do not have coequal dominion over the family home. Although parents may choose to grant their minor children joint access and mutual use of the home, parents normally retain control of the home as well as the power to rescind the authority they have given." (Id. at p. 482.)