In People v. Julian (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1524, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of vehicular manslaughter against victims Terri Keller (count 1) and Amanda Keller (count 2). The jury additionally found true great bodily injury enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivisions (a) and (b) attached to both manslaughter counts. As to count 1, the jury found true great bodily injury enhancements for causing the coma of Amanda, and inflicting great bodily injury on Alexis Keller. On count 2, the jury found true attached great bodily injury enhancements as to Terri and Alexis. The trial court sentenced defendant to the "four-year upper term ... for the manslaughter of Terri, a five-year enhancement for Amanda's great bodily injury ... and a three-year enhancement for Alexis's great bodily injury. With respect to the manslaughter of Amanda, a four-year upper term and 2 three-year great bodily injury enhancements for the injuries to Terri and Alexis were imposed and stayed under section 654." (Julian, at p. 1526.) Defendant appealed contending the trial court erred in imposing all the section 12022.7 enhancements. (Julian, at pp. 1526-1527.) The court in Julian held, "Although Terri and Amanda died as a result of their injuries and their deaths support the defendant's manslaughter convictions, in this case their injuries also support enhancements under section 12022.7." (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1530.) It reasoned such an "interpretation not only avoids the absurd result of diminishing punishment when a victim dies, it also is consistent with the requirement of section 654 a defendant be sentenced under the statute which provides the longest potential term of imprisonment." (Id. at p. 1531.) "To hold Alexis's injuries will support an enhancement but, because she died, Amanda's injuries will not, would permit a defendant ... to benefit to some extent from the fact one of his multiple victims died rather than survived. We of course must reject such a grotesque interpretation of the statute." (Ibid.) It further concluded a contrary interpretation was unnecessary to prevent double punishment because, as did the sentencing court in its case, application of section 654 would necessarily bar such a result. (Id. at pp. 1531-1532.)