In People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, the California Supreme Court determined that a person committed under the amended SVPA is not deprived of due process because he or she has the burden, after the initial commitment, to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she no longer meets the statutory criteria for commitment as a sexually violent predator. (McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1191.) The court explained that a person committed under the SVPA has been found to have previously committed the requisite qualifying offenses and to have, beyond a reasonable doubt, a " 'diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.' ( 6600, subd. (a).)" (Id. at p. 1191.) Therefore, as in Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 367, the likelihood that the person will be civilly committed on the basis of behavior that is " ' "within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable" ' " or merely idiosyncratic is "greatly diminished." (McKee, supra, at p. 1191.) The McKee court also found no merit in the contention that the trial court's discretion to deny as frivolous a committed person's petition for conditional release pursuant to section 6608, subdivision (a) violates due process. "The fact that the statute gives the court the authority to deny such petitions does not, of itself, serve as an obstacle to the primary due process goal of ensuring that only those individuals who continue to meet SVP criteria will remain involuntarily committed." (McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) Finally, the McKee court construed the amended SVPA to implicitly provide for the appointment of a state-funded mental health expert when a committed person petitions for release under section 6608, subdivision (a). "Given that the denial of access to expert opinion when an indigent individual petitions on his or her own to be released may pose a significant obstacle to ensuring that only those meeting SVP commitment criteria remain committed, we construe section 6608, subdivision (a), read in conjunction with section 6605, subdivision (a), to mandate appointment of an expert for an indigent SVP who petitions the court for release. Construing the amended SVPA in the above manner, we conclude it does not violate the due process clause." (McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1193.) The California Supreme Court held that SVP's are similarly situated to other civilly committed persons, including persons deemed mentally disordered offenders (MDO's) and those found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI's). Therefore, absent a showing of a compelling state interest in treating SVP's significantly less favorably than MDO's and NGI's, California's SVPA may violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. (McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1203, 1207.) The McKee court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the state could establish a compelling interest justifying its disparate treatment of SVP's, and whether such treatment is necessary to further its interest. (Id. at pp. 1207, 1210.) The court explained that the "government has not yet shown that the special treatment of SVP's is validly based on the degree of danger reasonably perceived as to that group, nor whether it arises from any medical or scientific evidence. On remand, the government will have an opportunity to justify Proposition 83's indefinite commitment provisions, at least as applied to McKee, and demonstrate that they are based on a reasonable perception of the unique dangers that SVP's pose rather than a special stigma that SVP's may bear in the eyes of California's electorate." (McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1210.) McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1172, observes that fundamental distinctions between classes of individuals subject to civil commitment are subject to strict scrutiny, but also that the government may make reasonable distinctions " 'depending on degrees of danger reasonably perceived as to special classes of persons.' " (Id. at p. 1210)