People v. Mendoza

In People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 1333, the appellate court agreed that while the words themselves did not constitute a terrorist threat, the jury could consider all of the surrounding circumstances, including the parties' history and subsequent actions taken by the defendant. In that case, less than 30 minutes after the threat was made, members of the defendant's gang parked their car in front of the victim's home and honked the horn to gain her attention. ( Id. at pp. 1341-1343.) In People v. Mendoza (1997) the appellant stated: " 'you fucked up my brother's testimony. I'm going to talk to some guys from Happy Town'. . . ." ( People v. Mendoza, supra, 59 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1340.) The court agreed with the appellant that this "did not articulate a threat to commit a specific crime resulting in death or great bodily injury." (Ibid.) However, in looking at the circumstances under which the threat was made, the court concluded, as we did in Martinez, that it was sufficient for a violation of section 422. "Thus, although appellant's words were ambiguous, did not mention a particular criminal act or give other particulars, a rational juror could have found--based on all the surrounding circumstances--appellant's words were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific to convey to Arambula a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of death or serious bodily injury." (59 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1342.) 2. In People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, the Supreme Court held a jury may consider evidence of voluntary intoxication in determining whether a defendant formed the requisite intent and had the necessary knowledge for culpability as an aider and abettor. As the Supreme Court noted, the mental state for an aider and abettor is the same for all crimes, namely, that to aid the perpetrator in the originally contemplated crime. ( Id. at p. 1132.) The Supreme Court went on to hold that voluntary intoxication has no bearing on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which extends aider and abettor liability to any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the perpetrator. ( Id. at p. 1133.)