In People v. Miller (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1015, the court noted "the timeliness of a Faretta motion made after a finding of guilt but before sentencing appears to be a question of first impression." (Miller, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.) Miller, after noting that "whether a trial court must grant a request for self-representation as a matter of right or whether it has discretion to grant the motion turns on whether the request is made during trial . . . concluded that a request for self-representation, made after the jury returned its verdict and his new trial motion had been denied, but well before sentencing, was not made during trial for the simple reason that sentencing occurs posttrial . . . . . . and sentencing is a proceeding separate and distinct from the trial." (Id. at pp. 1023-1024.) Miller concluded a request for self-representation made more than two months before the sentencing hearing, and after the defendant assured the court he would be prepared at the new sentencing date, was a timely assertion of his absolute right to self-representation at the new hearing, reasoning that "the concern that led to the conclusion that motions for self-representation made during trial are subject to the trial court's discretion, namely the potential disruption of proceedings already in progress, simply does not apply to sentencing hearings . . . ." (Id. at p. 1024.) However, Miller cautioned, "this is not to say that every request for self-representation at sentencing will be timely. Much as a request to represent oneself at trial must be made a reasonable time before trial commences, the request for self-representation at sentencing must be made within a reasonable time prior to commencement of the sentencing hearing." (Ibid.)