In People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, the victim called the defendant a "'jota' (translated as 'faggot')" and pushed him to the ground during an argument and the men were separated. (Id. at p. 216.) The defendant went inside his house for five to ten minutes and returned with a knife, which he used to stab the victim in the stomach three times. (Id. at p. 216.) There, similar to the prosecutor's statements in the present case, the prosecutor interspersed correct statements of law with incorrect statements regarding provocation and reasonableness, and told the jury during closing argument that sudden quarrel or heat of passion was limited to the situation in which the defendant's conduct was a reasonable response to the circumstances. (Id. at p. 220.) However, the appellate court held that the prosecutor's argument was incorrect, that the error was harmless, because it was presumed that the jury followed the trial court's correct instructions. (Id. at p. 224.) The Court of Appeal concluded the "taunt would not drive any ordinary person to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection," (id. at p. 226) and that the physical attack did not make any difference: "Calling Najera a 'jota' and pushing him are not sufficiently provocative under an objective standard to cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation." (Id. at p. 226, fn. 2.) In People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, the issue of prosecutorial misconduct was raised in the context of claims of waiver and ineffective trial counsel. During final argument, the prosecutor had urged that in determining whether the defendant acted in the heat of passion, there was "a reasonable, ordinary person standard . . . . Any reasonable, ordinary person walking in on a child being molested, if they had a gun in their hand, would probably do the same thing. . . . Would a reasonable person do what the defendant did? Would a reasonable person be so aroused as to kill somebody? That's the standard." (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.) In rebuttal, the prosecutor stated: "'The reasonable, prudent person standard . . . is based on conduct, what a reasonable person would do in a similar circumstance. Pull out a knife and stab him? I hope that's not a reasonable person standard.'" (Ibid.) The defendant argued that trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's comments constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court observed that "an unlawful homicide is upon '"a sudden quarrel or heat of passion"' if the killer's reason was obscured by a "'provocation"' sufficient to cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation." (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.) "The focus is on the provocation--the surrounding circumstances--and whether it was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to act rashly. How the killer responded to the provocation and the reasonableness of the response is not relevant to sudden quarrel or heat of passion." (Ibid.) After setting out the applicable legal principles, the court held that the prosecutor's remarks were misleading and a misstatement of law. It said that the record showed that the jury was misled by the remarks as during deliberations, it made an inquiry to the trial court concerning that very point. (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.) However, in Najera, despite the error, the court concluded that no reversal was necessary. The court explained that the remarks did not require a reversal as the victim conduct that precipitated the attack--calling the defendant a "'faggot'"--demonstrated no provocation. Thus, the error was harmless, as in the first instance, appellant was not entitled to instructions on voluntary manslaughter. (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 223-226.)