In People v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 705, the defendant was sentenced to a life term for petty theft because he had two prior serious felony convictions, one of which was theft-related. ( Id. at p. 714.) He argued his equal protection rights were violated because a petty thief with two prior serious felony convictions but no prior theft-related convictions is subject only to misdemeanor punishment. (Ibid.) In assessing this argument, the court set forth the familiar rule that "'the first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.' " (Ibid.) The court then stated, "There is always some difference between the two groups which a law treats in an unequal manner since an equal protection claim necessarily asserts that the law in some way distinguishes between the two groups. Thus, an equal protection claim cannot be resolved by simply observing that the members of group A have distinguishing characteristic X while the members of group B lack this characteristic. The 'similarly situated' prerequisite simply means that an equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis, unless there is some showing that the two groups are sufficiently similar with respect to the purpose of the law in question that some level of scrutiny is required in order to determine whether the distinction is justified." (Ibid.) Applying this test, the court found the two groups of offenders at issue were so similarly situated as to warrant equal protection review. ( Id. at p. 715.) The Court discussed the meaning of "similarly situated." "There is always some difference between the two groups which a law treats in an unequal manner since an equal protection claim necessarily asserts that the law in some way distinguishes between the two groups. Thus, an equal protection claim cannot be resolved by simply observing that the members of group A have distinguishing characteristic X while the members of group B lack this characteristic. The 'similarly situated' prerequisite simply means that an equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis, unless there is some showing that the two groups are sufficiently similar with respect to the purpose of the law in question that some level of scrutiny is required in order to determine whether the distinction is justified." ( Id. at p. 714.) In Nguyen, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th 705 (rev. denied Aug. 20, 1997), this court followed People v. Olivas (1976) in addressing a challenge to the Three Strikes law, which divides the class of recidivist offenders currently convicted of petty theft into two groups and treats them differently. Those with prior theft-related convictions are subject to significant prison terms, in some cases 25 years to life, because the prior conviction elevates the current petty theft offense from a misdemeanor to a felony and triggers sentencing under the Three Strikes law. Those without prior theft-related offense are subject to a jail term of six months because the current petty theft conviction remains a misdemeanor and does not trigger the Three Strikes law. ( Id. at pp. 713-714.) In light of Olivas, this court concluded that the classification scheme affected the defendant's fundamental interest in liberty. "The challenged distinction subjects some petty thieves to life sentences and others to no more than six months in jail. Like the two groups of offenders in Olivas, these two groups of offenders have committed the same offense. While it may be tempting to try to distinguish Olivas on the ground that it involved an age-based classification, the California Supreme Court explicitly stated that its decision that strict scrutiny applied was not based on the classification itself being suspect but solely on the fact that the classification affected a fundamental interest. That same interest is affected by the classification in question here. One group of offenders faces a significantly extended period of incarceration, a life sentence, while the other group faces no more than six months in jail. As in Olivas, the personal liberty interest of the individual offender facing an extended period of incarceration is significantly affected by this classification. We can find no substantial basis for distinguishing the interest at issue in Olivas from the interest at issue here." ( Id. at p. 717.)